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 ABSTRACT 
 
STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM:  
PARTICIPATION DECISION AND LABOR SUPPLY EFFECTS 
BY 
KYOUNGWOO LEE 
May 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Mary Beth Walker 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
Our study estimates the crowd-out of private health insurance following SCHIP 
expansions for children. We use panel data from the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP). We use multivariate regression models to the crowd-
out of private health insurance. This difference-in-differences approach controls for other 
factors that affect both the control group and treatment group, and measures the extent of 
crowd-out private coverage in the treatment group relative to the control group. We find 
that nearly 26 percent of the transitions from private coverage into SCHIP coverage were 
made by children who would have had private coverage in the absence of the expansions.  
This paper provides evidence that the SCHIP expansions have overall displacement effect 
of 52.9 percent for private coverage for those children who had private coverage or were 
uninsured from the first interview in 2001. 
 xi
 This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the impact of SCHIP on single 
mothers’ working decisions using recent CPS (Current Population Survey) data during 
1999-2005.  The empirical work requires a measure of the change in eligibility 
requirements; we compute a measure suggested by Yelowitz (1995). The major findings 
of this paper are: first, SCHIP expansions are found to have a significant positive impact 
on hours-worked decision; second, most models yielded results that indicated that SCHIP 
expansions have a generally insignificant impact on the decision to work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii
  
 
Chapter I  
Introduction 
 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was established as part 
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and represents the largest expansion of public health 
insurance programs since the 1965 passage of Medicare and Medicaid (CMS 2004). The 
goal of SCHIP was to increase the insurance coverage of children by extending eligibility 
for public insurance to children in working families with incomes too high to qualify for 
Medicaid but too low to afford private coverage. Between 1997 and 2001, the proportion 
of children eligible for public health insurance increased from roughly one-third to one-
half of all children. The number of children enrolled in SCHIP increased from 1 million 
children in December, 1998 to 5.3 million children in fiscal year 2002 (CMS 2003).  
To increase insurance coverage rates for children in near-poor families, states 
must enroll previously ineligible children in a new public health insurance program. 
SCHIP can provide two incentives for families to drop existing private coverage. First, 
SCHIP coverage often has lower cost (that is, premiums and/or co-payments) compared 
to private health insurance coverage; and second, it sometimes provides more 
comprehensive benefits. Employers, too, may face financial incentives to discontinue 
dependent coverage or reduce their contributions if SCHIP coverage is available for their 
low-wage workers. To the extent that new public coverage simply substitutes for private 
coverage already in place, the decrease in the rate of uninsured minors could be smaller 
 1
 2
than anticipated and fewer improvements in access to care and health status will be 
realized. Thus, the effect of the SCHIP expansion on overall coverage depends on how 
extent to which public health insurance is substituted for previously held privately 
provided benefits. Such substitution may also lead to greater-than-expected increases in 
program expenditures (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000) 
Consequently, policy makers have shown concern about the potential for SCHIP 
to crowd out private health insurance. In fact, the majority of newly eligible children for 
SCHIP already had private health insurance coverage (LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004). 
The SCHIP legislation was designed to specify procedures used to ensure that the 
insurance coverage provided under SCHIP does not substitute for coverage under group 
health plans.1 Title XXI also required states in their evaluations to review and assess their 
activities to coordinate their SCHIP program with other private programs providing 
health care.2 States’ anti-crowd out efforts entail measures designed to limit the relative 
attractiveness of public health insurance for those with private health benefits before the 
children in a family become eligible for SCHIP benefits.  
Many empirical studies have yielded crowd-out estimates which range from zero 
to 77 percent (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000; Card and Shore-Sheppard 2003; 
Cunningham, Hadley, and Reschovsky 2002; Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and 
Kenney 1996; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2003; LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004; Shore-
Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen 2000; Thorpe and Florence 1998; Yazici and 
                                                 
1 “State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” Title XXI, Social Security Act, 1997, Section 
2101 (b)(3)(c) 
 
2 “State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” Title XXI, Social Security Act, 1997, Section 
2108 (b)(1)(D) 
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Kaestner 2000). These crowd-out studies are not directly comparable, since the results 
vary by measurement of the crowd out effect and with the data and statistical methods 
used. Nevertheless, there appears to be a general consensus that expanding public health 
insurance coverage to those in higher income brackets may produce a greater degree of 
crowd out.  
The above-cited literature on SCHIP expansions compared the reduction in the 
share of the population with private coverage to the increase in the share of the 
population with public coverage due to the expansion. The contribution of the analysis 
done here is that we consider actual SCHIP coverage transitions among low-income 
children (especially among the newly eligible population) by using 2001 SIPP (Survey of 
Income and Program Participation) panel. These data directly track changes in the health 
insurance coverage of children during the years of the SCHIP expansions.  
Another incentive effect of SCHIP expansion concerns the impact of the 
expansion on single mother’s labor market outcomes through the labor supply decisions 
of potential public assistance recipients. There are several potential effects. For example, 
one might expect that the SCHIP expansion would lead to an increase in labor force 
participation, as increased work, and hence income, would no longer cause low-income 
women to lose health insurance for children due to exceeding Medicaid income-
eligibility limits. The impact of expanded SCHIP coverage on hours worked is 
ambiguous, as many newly eligible families already have working mothers.  
There is a substantial literature that followed the Medicaid program expansions 
during the mid-1980s. This research analyzed how the availability of Medicaid health 
insurance affected the work decision of single women with children. Recent studies 
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suggest that health insurance availability, and Medicaid in particular, have either no or a 
very small effect on the labor force participation of low income single mothers (Blank 
1989; Moffitt and Wolfe 1992; Winkler 1991; Yelowitz 1995). This is somewhat 
surprising given the potential importance of public health insurance for this population 
and their children.  
There is relatively little evidence, however, on the effect of SCHIP on low-
income female-headed households in the United States. One study – Wolfe et al (2005) - 
examined the effect of Wisconsin’s SCHIP on the labor market outcomes of low-income 
single mothers. They found that introduction of SCHIP (BadgerCare) affected single 
mothers’ labor supply in Wisconsin. In this research, we quantify the impact of the 
expansion of income eligibility limits on single mothers’ labor supply and provided new 
national evidence on the SCHIP incentive effect.  
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. In the next chapter, we lay out 
the background of the SCHIP program and proved data showing the variation in states’ 
provision of SCHIP. In chapter III, we estimates the magnitude of crowd out among 
children following the SCHIP expansions, and presents national estimates of the effect of 
SCHIP program using the longitudinal SCHIP coverage data. In chapter IV, the impact of 
SCHIP on single mothers’ working decisions is analyzed using recent data from the CPS 
(Current Population Survey). Chapter V concludes the work.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter II 
Review on the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
 
Growth of SCHIP 
 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program was enacted as part of the 
Balance Budget Act of 1997. The purpose of the new State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, codified as Title XXI of the Social Security Act, is “to provide funds to States 
to enable them to initiate and expand the provision of child health assistance to uninsured, 
low-income children.”3 SCHIP targets children in low-income working families with 
incomes too high to qualify for the Medicaid but too low to afford private coverage. 
Generally, children in families with income less than 200 percent of the income poverty 
line are eligible,4 although states are allowed some flexibility in choosing eligibility 
income cutoffs.5 States were granted the freedom to increase the SCHIP income poverty 
threshold to at least 200 percent of poverty or by 50 percentage points above the 
Medicaid poverty cutoffs, whichever is higher.6  We can see from Table 1 that there are 
some states extending coverage to children in families with income levels up to
                                                 
3 “State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” Title XXI, Social Security Act, 1997, Section 
2101 (a) 
4 If children are eligible for Medicaid or a member of family eligible for state employee insurance, 
they are not eligible for SCHIP coverage (CMS 2004). 
5 Determining eligibility of  SCHIP coverage depends on , for example, children’s age, family 
total income, residency area, access to other health insurance and duration of uninsured periods before 
SCHIP enrollment  (Green Book 2004) 
6 Sec. 2110(b)(1) of the Social Security Act. In 1997, 200 percent of the federal poverty level 
amounted to about $32,000 for a family of four. 
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 350 percent of the poverty level (New Jersey). States have a great deal of latitude in 
determining eligibility. 
Title XXI authorized that enrollment could begin as early as October 1, 1997, and 
eight states began covering children under SCHIP during 1997 (Table 2). The majority of 
states (34 in all) began enrollment in 1998, while 7 states began enrollment in 1999. Two 
states, Hawaii and Washington, began enrolling children in 2000.  
For the six years Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 1999 through 2004 children’s health 
coverage expanded steadily, Table 3 and Figure 1 show a continued and consistent rise in 
the number of children enrolled for at least some part of the year in SCHIP. In FFY 2004, 
6 million children were enrolled for at least part of the year in SCHIP, which is an 
increase of 1.5 million children, or 24 percent, over the 4.6 million children enrolled in 
FFY 2001. The 6 million children enrolled in FFY 2004 are more than three times as 
many children enrolled in FFY 1999. 
Under SCHIP, states have worked to improve enrollment and retention processes 
and have used many different outreach strategies (Dick A et al. 2002; Ross and Hill 
2003). Administrative reforms include establishing continuous eligibility, simplifying 
application forms for Medicaid and SCHIP, eliminating face-to-face interviews and 
resource tests, allowing self-declaration of income and electronic submissions and using 
passive renewal systems. Outreach strategies include use of mass media campaigns, 
establishing toll-free information lines and web sites to increase awareness about 
programs.  
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TABLE 1. STATE VARIATIONS IN MEDICAID AND SCHIP INCOME 
THRESHOLDS, BY STATE 
 
Medicaid Thresholds as of May 20, 1998 
(% of FPL) 
SCHIP  Thresholds 
(% of FPL) 
 
`Infants 
Children 
Under 
Age 6 
Children 
Ages 6 to 
14 
Children 
Ages 14 
to 19 
FFY 
1999 
FFY 
2000 
FFY 
2001 
        
Alabama 133 133 100 100 200 200 200 
Alaska 133 133 100 90 200 200 200 
Arizona 140 133 100 30 200 200 200 
Arkansas 200 200 200 200 100 100 100 
California 200 133 100 100 250 250 250 
Colorado 133 133 100 37 185 185 185 
Connecticut 185 185 185 185 300 300 300 
Delaware 185 133 100 100 200 200 200 
District of Columbia 185 133 100 37 200 200 200 
Florida 185 133 100 100 200 200 200 
Georgia 185 133 100 100 200 200 200 
Hawaii 185 133 100 100 - 200 200 
Idaho 160 160 160 160 150 150 150 
Illinois 200 133 130 133 133 185 185 
Indiana 150 133 100 100 150 200 200 
Iowa 185 133 100 37 185 200 200 
Kansas 150 133 100 100 200 200 200 
Kentucky 185 133 100 46 200 200 200 
Louisiana 133 133 100 17 150 150 150 
Maine 185 133 125 125 185 185 185 
Maryland 185 185 185 33 200 200 200 
Massachusetts 185 133 133 133 200 200 200 
Michigan 185 150 150 150 200 200 200 
Minnesota 275 275 275 275 280 280 280 
Mississippi 185 133 100 32 100 200 200 
Missouri 185 133 100 100 300 300 300 
Montana 133 133 100 48 150 150 150 
Nebraska 150 133 100 100 185 185 185 
Nevada 133 133 100 31 200 200 200 
New Hampshire 300 185 185 185 300 300 300 
New Jersey 185 133 133 133 350 350 350 
New Mexico 185 185 185 185 235 235 235 
New York 185 133 100 51 192 192 192 
North Carolina 185 133 100 100 200 200 200 
North Dakota 133 133 100 100 100 140 140 
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TABLE 1. CONTINUED 
Medicaid Thresholds as of May 20, 1998 
(% of FPL) 
SCHIP  Thresholds 
(% of FPL) 
 
`Infants 
Children 
Under 
Age 6 
Children 
Ages 6 to 
14 
Children 
Ages 14 
to 19 
FFY 
1999 
FFY 
2000 
FFY 
2001 
        
Ohio 150 150 100 100 200 200 200 
Oklahoma 185 185 100 90 200 200 200 
Oregon 133 133 100 30 200 200 200 
Pennsylvania 185 133 200 200 100 100 100 
Rhode Island 250 250 100 100 250 250 250 
South Carolina 185 150 100 37 185 185 185 
South Dakota 133 133 185 185 300 300 300 
Tennessee 400 400 100 100 200 200 200 
Texas 185 133 100 37 200 200 200 
Utah 133 133 100 100 200 200 200 
Vermont 225 225 100 100 200 200 200 
Virginia 133 133 100 100 - 200 200 
Washington 200 200 160 160 150 150 150 
West Virginia 150 133 130 133 133 185 185 
Wisconsin 185 185 100 100 150 200 200 
Wyoming 133 133 100 37 185 200 200 
 
Source: Medicaid Eligibility for Families and Children in Kaiser Family Foundation  
(Available from http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2106-eligibility5.cfm; accessed 10 November 2005), and The 
State Children's Health Insurance Program Annual Enrollment Report, Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 1999, 
2000 and 2001 on Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Available from 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalSCHIPPolicy/SCHIPER/list.asp; accessed 10 November 2005) 
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TABLE  2. SCHIP EXPANSION TYPE, AS OF MARCH 31, 2001 
Date implemented  
STATE 
Expansion 
Type Plan Name M-SCHIP S-SCHIP
     
Alabama COMBO Medicaid/ALL Kids Feb-98 Oct-98 
Alaska M-SCHIP Denali KidCare Mar-99 - 
Arizona S-SCHIP KidsCare - Nov-98 
Arkansas M-SCHIP ARKidsFirst Oct-98 - 
California COMBO Access for Infants and Mothers&Healthy Families Mar-98 - 
Colorado S-SCHIP Child Health Plan Plus (CHP+) - Apr-98 
Connecticut COMBO Husky A & Husky B Oct-97 Jul-98 
Delaware S-SCHIP Delaware Healthy Children Program - Feb-99 
District of  
Columbia M-SCHIP Healthy DC Kids Oct-98 - 
Florida COMBO Florida Kids Care Program Apr-98 Apr-98 
Georgia S-SCHIP PeachCare for Kids - Nov-98 
Hawaii M-SCHIP Hawaii Title XXI Program Jul-00 - 
Idaho M-SCHIP Idaho Children's Health Insurance Program Oct-97 - 
Illinois COMBO KidCare Assist Expansion/KidCare Share&KidCare Premium Jan-98 Oct-98 
Indiana COMBO Hoosier Healthwise Jun-97 Jan-00 
Iowa COMBO Medicaid/Healthy and Well Kids in Iowa(HAWK-I) Jul-98 Jan-99 
Kansas S-SCHIP HealthWave - Jan-99 
Kentucky COMBO KCHIP Jul-98 Nov-99 
Louisiana M-SCHIP LaCHIP Nov-98 - 
Maine COMBO Medicaid/Cub Care Jul-98 Aug-98 
Maryland M-SCHIP Maryland's Children's Health Program Jul-98 - 
Massachusetts COMBO MassHealth/Family Assistance Oct-97 Aug-98 
Michigan COMBO Healthy Kids/MIChild Apr-98 May-98 
Minnesota M-SCHIP Minnesota Care Sep-98 - 
Mississippi COMBO Mississippi Health Benefits Program Jul-98 Jan-00 
Missouri M-SCHIP MC+ for Kids Jul-98 - 
Montana S-SCHIP MT CHIP - Jan-99 
Nebraska M-SCHIP Kids Connection Jul-98  
Nevada S-SCHIP Nevada Check-Up - Oct-98 
New Hampshire COMBO Healthy Kids May-98 Jan-99 
New Jersey COMBO NJ FamilyCare Plan A/NJ FamilyCare Plan B, C, D Feb-98 Mar-98 
New Mexico M-SCHIP State Children's Health Insurance Program Mar-99 - 
New York COMBO Medicaid/Child Health Plus (CHPlus) Jan-99 Apr-98 
North Carolina S-SCHIP NC Health Choice for Children - Oct-98 
North Dakota COMBO Healthy Steps Oct-98 Nov-99 
Ohio M-SCHIP Healthy Start Jan-98 - 
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TABLE 2. CONTINUED 
Date implemented  
STATE 
Expansion 
Type Plan Name M-SCHIP S-SCHIP
     
Oklahoma M-SCHIP SoonerCare Dec-97 - 
Oregon S-SCHIP OR CHIP - Jul-98 
Pennsylvania S-SCHIP PA CHIP - May-98 
Rhode Island M-SCHIP RIte Care Oct-97 - 
South Carolina M-SCHIP Partmenrs for Healthy Children Oct-97 - 
South Dakota COMBO SD CHIP/CHIP NM Jul-98 Jul-00 
Tennessee M-SCHIP TennCare for Children Oct-97 - 
Texas COMBO TX CHIP Jul-98 Apr-00 
Utah S-SCHIP Utah CHIP - Aug-98 
Vermont S-SCHIP Dr.Dynasaur - Oct-98 
Virginia S-SCHIP Family Access to Medical Insurance Security Plan (FAMIS) - Oct-98 
Washington S-SCHIP Washington CHIP - Feb-00 
West Virginia S-SCHIP WV SCHIP Jul-98 Apr-99 
Wisconsin M-SCHIP BadgerCare Apr-99 - 
Wyoming S-SCHIP Wyoming KidCare - Dec-99 
 
Source: TableI.1 in Rosenbach, Ellwood, Irvin, Young, Conroy, Quinn and Kell (2003), 2-3, available from 
www.cms.hhs.gov/Reports/downloads/rosenbach_2001_5.pdf; accessed 18 October 2005 and Shore-
Sheppard (2003) 
 
Note: M-SCHIP =Medicaid Expansion Program, S-SCHIP =Separate Children Health Program, COMBO 
=Combination (Medicaid Expansion and Separate Children Health Program). When more than one name is 
noted, the first is that of the Medicaid Expansion Program; and the rest are the names of Separate Children 
Health Programs. The Expansion type is as of March 31, 2001. 
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TABLE 3. NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER ENROLLED IN SCHIP FOR FEDERAL 
FISCAL YEAR 1999 THROUGH 2004 
 
STATE Expansion Type FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 
        
Total  1,959,330 3,333,879 4,601,098 5,325,494  5,841,350  6,063,614 
    
Alabama COMBO 38,980 37,587 68,179 83,359  78,554  79,407 
Alaska M-SCHIP 8,033 13,413 21,831 22,291  22,934  21,966 
Arizona S-SCHIP 26,807 60,803 86,863 92,705  90,468  87,681 
Arkansas M-SCHIP 913 1,892 2,884 1,912  NR NR
California COMBO 222,351 477,615 693,048 856,994  955,152  1,035,752 
Colorado S-SCHIP 24,116 34,889 45,773 51,826  74,144  57,244 
Connecticut COMBO 9,912 18,804 18,720 21,346  21,470  21,438 
Delaware S-SCHIP 2,433 4,474 5,567 9,691  9,744  10,250 
District of 
Columbia M-SCHIP 3,029 2,264 2,807 5,060  5,875  6,093 
Florida COMBO 154,594 227,463 298,705 368,180  443,177  419,707 
Georgia S-SCHIP 47,581 120,626 182,762 221,005  251,711  280,083 
Hawaii M-SCHIP NI 2,256 7,137 8,474  12,022  19,237 
Idaho M-SCHIP 8,482 12,449 13,276 16,895  16,877  19,054 
Illinois COMBO 42,699 62,507 83,510 68,032  126,855  234,027 
Indiana COMBO 31,246 44,373 56,986 66,225  73,762  80,698 
Iowa COMBO 9,795 19,958 23,270 34,506  37,060  40,776 
Kansas S-SCHIP 14,443 26,306 34,241 40,783  45,662  44,350 
Kentucky COMBO 18,579 55,593 66,796 93,941  94,053  94,500 
Louisiana M-SCHIP 21,580 49,995 69,579 87,675  104,763  105,580 
Maine COMBO 13,657 22,742 27,003 22,586  29,474  29,171 
Maryland M-SCHIP 18,072 93,081 109,983 125,180  130,161  111,488 
Massachusetts COMBO 67,852 113,034 105,072 116,699  125,177  166,508 
Michigan COMBO 26,652 37,148 76,181 71,882  77,467  NR
Minnesota M-SCHIP 21 24 49 49  48  4,784 
Mississippi COMBO 13,218 20,451 52,436 64,805  75,010  82,900 
Missouri M-SCHIP 49,529 73,825 106,594 112,004  150,292  176,014 
Montana S-SCHIP 1,019 8,317 13,518 13,875  13,084  15,281 
Nebraska M-SCHIP 9,713 11,400 13,933 16,227  45,490  33,314 
Nevada S-SCHIP 7,802 15,946 28,026 37,878  47,183  38,519 
New Hampshire COMBO 4,554 4,272 5,982 8,138  9,893  10,951 
New Jersey COMBO 75,652 89,034 99,847 117,053  119,272  127,244 
New Mexico M-SCHIP 4,500 6,106 10,347 19,940  18,841  20,804 
New York COMBO 521,301 769,457 872,949 807,145  795,111  826,611 
North Carolina S-SCHIP 57,300 103,567 98,650 120,090  149,979  174,259 
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TABLE 3. CONTINUED 
STATE Expansion Type FY1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004
    
Total  1,959,330 3,333,879 4,601,098 5,325,494  5,841,350  6,063,614 
    
North Dakota COMBO 266 2,573 3,404 4,463  4,955  5,133 
Ohio M-SCHIP 83,688 111,436 158,265 183,034  204,114  220,190 
Oklahoma M-SCHIP 40,196 57,719 38,858 84,490  91,914  100,761 
Oregon S-SCHIP 27,285 37,092 41,468 42,976  44,752  46,720 
Pennsylvania S-SCHIP 81,758 119,710 141,163 148,689  160,015  177,415 
Rhode Island M-SCHIP 7,288 11,539 17,398 19,515  24,505  25,573 
South Carolina M-SCHIP 45,737 59,853 66,183 68,928  76,128  75,597 
South Dakota COMBO 3,191 5,888 8,937 11,183  11,361  13,397 
Tennessee M-SCHIP 9,732 14,861 8,615 10,216  - -
Texas COMBO 50,878 130,519 500,950 727,452  726,428  650,856 
Utah S-SCHIP 13,040 25,294 34,655 33,808  37,766  38,693 
Vermont S-SCHIP 2,055 4,081 2,996 6,162  6,467  6,693 
Virginia S-SCHIP 16,895 37,681 73,102 67,974  83,716  99,569 
Washington S-SCHIP NI 2,616 7,621 8,754  9,571  17,002 
West Virginia S-SCHIP 7,957 21,659 33,144 35,949  35,320  36,906 
Wisconsin M-SCHIP 12,949 47,140 57,183 62,391  68,332  67,893 
Wyoming S-SCHIP NI 2,547 4,652 5,059  5,241  5,525 
 
Source: CMS Annual Enrollment Reports for FY1999, FY2000, FY2001, FY2002, FY2003, FY2004. 
Available from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalSCHIPPolicy; accessed 19 October 2005. 
 
Note: NI = State’s SCHIP program was not implemented in FFY 1999. Hawaii, Washington and Wyoming 
did not implement their SCHIP programs until FFY 2000. NR = Indicates that state has not reported data 
via the Statistical Enrollment Data System (SEDS). Tennessee does not currently cover any children in its 
SCHIP program in FFY2003 and FFY2004 
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Figure 1. SCHIP ever enrolled federal fiscal year 1999 through 2004 
 
Source: CMS Annual Enrollment Reports for FY1999, FY2000, FY2001, FY2002, FY2003, FY2004. 
Available from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalSCHIPPolicy; accessed 13 November 2005. 
 
 
 
 
Administrative options for states 
 
SCHIP offers participating states two basic approaches to the provision of child 
health assistance: expansion of Medicaid, or establishment of a new child health 
assistance program to aid children who are ineligible for Medicaid or are not covered by 
another form of creditable coverage (such as coverage under an employer-group plan). 
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As of March 31, 2001, 17 states operated Medicaid expansion program (referred to as M-
SCHIP), 16 states operated separate child health programs (referred to as S-SCHIP), and 
18 states used both approaches to expand coverage (referred to as COMBO) (Table 1).  
States can expand Medicaid by increasing the maximum family income allowable 
for children. States with existing children’s health programs can expand those programs, 
either by increasing the number of spaces available or by allowing higher-income 
children in, if those programs follow all Medicaid eligibility rules regarding valuation of 
family income, geography, residency, and comparability of coverage. Alternatively, 
states can establish new programs that comply with the federal law. States with separate 
SCHIP programs have broad discretion to set eligibility standards and can take into 
account geography, residency, access to other coverage, and age.7 In all instances, the 
state will receive federal matching funds, up to the state’s allotment, for the new children 
enrolled. States may combine these two approaches. That is, a state may use some if its 
SCHIP funds to expand Medicaid and the rest to provide another form of child health 
assistance.  
Under a Medicaid expansion program, the eligibility rules of Medicaid apply 
(CMS 2004). However, states were allowed to create a separate optional program within 
their Medicaid program for SCHIP children (such as establishing waiting periods and 
implementing enrollment fees) through an 1115 waiver (Green book 2004). While the 
income thresholds were different for each program, the SCHIP children would qualify for 
the same benefits as Medicaid children. With a separate SCHIP program, the state must 
offer a benefit package that is comparable to one of three private benchmark insurance 
plans: the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) Blue Cross standard 
                                                 
7 Sec. 2102(b)(1) of the Social Security Act. 
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option plan, the state’s employee health benefit plan, or the health maintenance 
organization (HMO) with the largest number of commercially insured members in the 
state.8 A state with separate SCHIP programs must provide coverage that is “equivalent 
to the benefits coverage in a benchmark package” and that covers certain basic services.9  
The primary reason for expanding Medicaid is that states can build on existing 
infrastructure. Medicaid programs have existing networks of providers, systems for 
handling client and provider issues such as enrollment, education, and appeals, and 
mechanisms for rate setting, claims payment, and fraud prevention. In addition, 
administrative costs for Medicaid are quite low-averaging approximately 5 percent of 
total program costs.10  However, states that expanded their Medicaid programs lose the 
opportunity to increase program flexibility.11  Thus, this approach is losing flexibility 
afforded states in designing their own system under new law. The principal attraction of 
establishing a new state program, or building upon an existing one, is the flexibility in 
designing a program that better meets the needs of children in a particular state. This 
choice, of course, means that states face administrative and design challenges.  
Every state has established an SCHIP program. The average SCHIP income 
threshold, as of September 30, 2001, was 203 percent of poverty. Table 1 summarizes the 
types of expansions, how the states’ income eligibility cutoffs vary across states and age 
                                                 
8 Sec. 2103(b)  
9 Sec. 2103(a)(1). Basic services are inpatient and outpatient hospital care, physicians’ surgical 
and medical services, laboratory and x-ray services, and well-baby and well-child care, including age-
appropriate immunizations. Benchmark-equivalent packages must cover these services up to 100 percent of 
their aggregate actuarial value. Equivalence is determined in relation to the “aggregate value” of the 
benchmark for both “basic’ services as well as “additional services” covered in the equivalent package. 
State benchmark-equivalent packages must cover certain additional services (prescribed drugs, mental 
health services, vision services, and hearing services) if such services are covered in the benchmark 
selected by the state, up to 75 percent of their aggregate actuarial value.  
10 . Data from the U.S. Health Care Financing Administration for 1995. Data available at the 
HCFA web site. 
11 See, for example, National Governors’ Association Policy EC-8, on Medicaid, available at the 
NGA web site. 
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groups. It is clear from Table 1 that there was unevenness in cross-state eligibility and in 
eligibility among children of different ages before SCHIP. In many states prior to SCHIP, 
income eligibility cutoffs for younger children are more generous than for older children. 
Roughly 50 percent of the states set 1997 Medicaid cutoffs as family income below 100 
percent of the poverty level for children 15 to 18 years of age children. Most of states 
also have more generous Medicaid eligibility criteria for children 0 to 5 years of age 
relative to children 6 to 14 years of age. The SCHIP expansions largely eliminated this 
within-state variation in eligibility based on age. Likewise, under the SCHIP expansions, 
states with lower eligibility limits for Medicaid experienced the largest increases in the 
proportion of children eligible for public benefits under SCHIP, so that the SCHIP 
expansions have reduced cross-state variation in the implementation of the Medicaid 
program (Cunningham 2001; Ullman and Hill 2001). 
Figure 2 depicts how the extent of the expansion of coverage under SCHIP varies 
by age. On average, SCHIP raised income thresholds by 61 percentage points among 
children ages 1 through 5, but among older adolescents (ages 17 and 18), SCHIP 
expanded coverage by an average of 129 percentage points. Equally important, SCHIP 
has enabled states to minimize the impact of the traditional “stairstep” approach to 
eligibility under Medicaid that, in most states, left some children within a low-income 
family without coverage. 
Table 4 reflects the extent to which SCHIP has allowed states to extend eligibility 
for publicly financed health insurance coverage beyond the thresholds set by Medicaid as 
of May 20, 1998. Narrow expansions reflect increases of less than 50 percentage points in 
all age categories, or at least a 50 percentage point increase in one age category only (18 
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states); intermediate expansions reflect increases of at least 50 percentage points in two 
age categories (6 states); and broad expansions reflect increases of at least 50 percentage 
points in three or four age categories (27 states).  
States continue to modify the eligibility levels for their SCHIP programs. Since 
March 2001, for example, Georgia increased eligibility in its S-SCHIP program from 200 
to 235 percent of poverty. Maine raised its S-SCHIP threshold from 185 to 200 percent of 
poverty. Maryland implemented an S-SCHIP component that covers children in families 
with income between 200 and 300 percent of poverty. New York increased the net 
income threshold from 192 to 200 percent of poverty for its S-SCHIP program effectively 
increasing eligibility to 250 percent of poverty through the use of income disregards. 
Finally, Wyoming expanded S-SCHIP eligibility from 134 to 150 percent of poverty. 
 
 
Financing structure 
 
An essential component of the SCHIP program is its matching financing structure. 
That is, funds are only available to states that spend some of their own funds. The federal 
statute establishes certain criteria for determining allowable state expenditures, the most 
important of which is an extension to SCHIP of Medicaid’s prohibition against the use of 
provider taxes or donations to finance the state share of SCHIP.12  
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Sec.2107(e)(1)(C) 
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TABLE 4.ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE LEVELS OF INCOME THRESHOLDS 
UNDER SCHIP, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 
 
Level of SCHIP Income 
Thresholds Relative to 
Medicadid 
Absolute level of SCHIP Income Thresholds 
 
At or below 150 
percent of poverty 
(N=8) 
151 to 200 percent of 
poverty (N=8) 
At 200 percent of poverty 
(N=25) 
Over 200 percent of 
poverty 
(N=10) 
Narrow  
(N=18) 
Arkansas 
Idaho 
Louisiana 
North Dakota 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Wyoming 
Illinois 
Maine 
Oklahoma 
Maryland 
Michigan 
Ohio 
New Mexico 
Minnesota 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
Washington 
 
Intermediate 
(N=6) Montana 
Colorado 
Oregon 
Nebraska 
New Your 
Wisconsin 
  
Broad 
(N=27)   
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Massachusetts 
Mississippi 
Nevada 
North Carolina 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Texas 
Utah 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
California 
Connecticut 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
Missouri 
 
Source: Source: Medicaid Eligibility for Familes and Children in Kaiser Family Foundation  
(Available from http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2106-eligibility5.cfm; accessed 14 November 2005), and The 
State Children's Health Insurance Program Annual Enrollment Report, Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 1999, 
2000 and 2001 on Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Available from 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalSCHIPPolicy/SCHIPER/list.asp; accessed 14 November 2005) 
 
Note: The relative level of SCHIP income thresholds reflects the magnitude of the expansion relative to 
traditional Medicaid across for age categories: less than 1 year, 1 through 5,, 6 through 14, and 14 through 
19.  
Narrow = Increased coverage by less than 50 percentage points or increased coverage by at least 50 
percentage points for one age category 
Intermediate = Increased coverage by at least 50 percentage points for two age categories. 
Broad=Increased coverage by at least 50 percentage points for three or four age categories. 
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Average SCHIP Threshold 
 
Figure 2. Medicaid and SCHIP average eligibility thresholds based on family income as a 
percentage of the federal poverty level, as of September 30, 2001 
 
Source: Source: Medicaid Eligibility for Families and Children in Kaiser Family Foundation  
(Available from http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2106-eligibility5.cfm; accessed 15 Noverber 2005), and The 
State Children's Health Insurance Program Annual Enrollment Report, Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 1999, 
2000 and 2001 on Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Available from 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalSCHIPPolicy/SCHIPER/list.asp; accessed 17 November 2005) 
Note: The average Medicaid thresholds are based on the thresholds in place on May 20, 1998 
 
 
 
 
0 
 50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
1   6  14 
Age 
179 
155 
133 
111 
203 
Average Medicaid Threshold 
 
 20
The law also requires that states maintain their Medicaid programs at June 1997 levels. 
States also must maintain a 1996 level of effort with respect to other state child health 
expenditures, including expenditures under existing state comprehensive benefit 
programs.13
This structure creates incentives for state participation but limits federal budget 
exposure.  Federal matching rates are higher under SCHIP than under Medicaid. The 
federal SCHIP contribution is equal to a state’s “federal medical assistance percentage” 
(FMAP) increased by 30 percent of the difference between 100 and the state’s FMAP, 
but is capped at 85 percent (Table 5).14 Under SCHIP, states are allotted funds based on a 
matching formula established by Congress and each state is allowed to define the targeted 
group of low-income children to receive health insurance through the SCHIP program.15 
Once a state has exhausted its federal allotment, additional federal SCHIP funds are 
available only if other states have unspent allotments. SCHIP provides states with nearly 
$40 billion in federal matching funds over ten years to expand coverage for low-income 
children. The Balanced Budget Act authorizes $20.3 billion in federal funds from FY 
1998 through FY 2002 and $19.4 billion over the second five years. Over the ten-year 
period, the funds are allocated as follows: $4.275 billion per year in FY 1998-2001, 
falling to $3.15 billion annually in FY 2002 through 2004, and then rising to $4.05 billion 
from FY 2005 through 2006, and reaching $5 billion for 2007, for a total of $40 billion 
(Figure 3). 
                                                 
13 Sec. 2105(d). 
14 62 Federal Register 48098 (12 September 1997) 
15 Federal SCHIP allotments are made in accordance with a formula that takes into account the 
number of low-income children, with and without insurance, with the formula weighted toward low-income 
children in the latter years of implementation, as the number of insured children grows. 62 Federal Register 
48098 (12 September 1997) 
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Figure 3. Federal allocations for SCHIP FFY 1998-2007 
 
Source: Federal Register, 1997 
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TABLE 5. FEDERAL MATCHING RATE (FMAP) FOR SCHIP 
 
STATE FFY1999 FFY2000 FFY2001 FFY2002 FFY2003 FFY2004
       
Alabama 78.49 78.70 78.99 79.32 79.42 79.53 
Alaska 71.86 71.86 69.23 70.17 70.79 70.87 
Arizona 75.85 76.14 76.04 75.49 77.08 77.08 
Arkansas 81.07 81.00 81.11 80.85 82.00 82.27 
California 66.09 66.17 65.88 65.98 65.00 65.00 
Colorado 65.42 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
Connecticut 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
Delaware 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
District of Columbia 79.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 
Florida 69.07 69.56 69.63 69.50 71.18 71.25 
Georgia 72.33 71.92 71.77 71.30 71.72 71.71 
Hawaii 65.00 65.71 67.70 69.44 71.14 71.23 
Idaho 78.89 79.11 79.53 79.71 79.67 79.32 
Illinois 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
Indiana 72.71 73.22 73.43 73.43 73.38 73.62 
Iowa 74.32 74.14 73.87 74.00 74.45 74.75 
Kansas 72.03 72.02 71.90 72.14 72.11 72.57 
Kentucky 79.37 79.39 79.27 78.96 78.92 79.06 
Louisiana 79.26 79.22 79.37 79.21 79.90 80.14 
Maine 76.48 76.35 76.28 76.61 76.35 76.21 
Maryland 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
Massachusetts 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
Michigan 66.91 68.58 69.33 69.45 68.79 69.12 
Minnesota 66.05 66.04 65.78 65.00 65.00 65.00 
Mississippi 83.75 83.76 83.77 83.26 83.63 83.96 
Missouri 72.17 72.36 72.72 72.74 72.86 73.03 
Montana 80.21 80.61 81.13 80.98 81.07 81.00 
Nebraska 73.02 72.62 72.27 71.69 71.66 71.92 
Nevada 65.00 65.00 65.25 65.00 66.67 68.45 
New Hampshire 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
New Jersey 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
New Mexico 81.09 81.32 81.66 81.13 82.19 82.40 
New York 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 
North Carolina 74.15 73.74 73.73 73.02 73.79 74.00 
North Dakota 78.96 79.29 78.99 78.91 77.85 77.82 
Ohio 70.78 71.07 71.32 71.15 71.18 71.46 
Oklahoma 79.59 79.76 79.87 79.30 79.39 79.17 
Oregon 72.38 71.97 72.00 71.44 72.11 72.57 
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TABLE 5. CONTINUED 
 
STATE FFY1999 FFY2000 FFY2001 FFY2002 FFY2003 FFY2004
       
Pennsylvania 67.64 67.67 67.53 68.26 68.28 68.33 
Rhode Island 67.83 67.64 67.65 66.72 68.78 69.22 
South Carolina 78.89 78.97 79.31 78.54 78.87 78.90 
South Dakota 77.71 78.10 77.82 76.15 75.70 75.97 
Tennessee 74.16 74.17 74.65 74.55 75.21 75.08 
Texas 73.72 72.95 72.40 72.12 71.99 72.15 
Utah 80.25 80.09 80.01 79.00 79.87 80.20 
Vermont 73.38 73.57 73.68 74.14 73.69 72.94 
Virginia 66.12 66.17 66.30 66.02 65.37 65.00 
Washington 66.75 66.28 65.49 65.26 65.00 65.00 
West Virginia 82.13 82.35 82.74 82.69 82.53 82.63 
Wisconsin 71.20 71.15 71.50 71.00 70.90 70.89 
Wyoming 74.86 74.83 75.22 73.38 72.92 71.84 
 
Sources:  
FY1999: Federal Register November 24, 1997 (Vol. 62, No. 226), 62613- 62615, available from 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap99.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
FY2000: Federal Register January 12, 1999 (Vol. 64, No. 7), 1805-1808, available from  
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap00.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
FY2001: Federal Register February 23, 2000 (Vol. 65, No. 36), 8979-8980, available from 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap01.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
FY2002: Federal Register, November 17, 2000,  available from  
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap02.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
FY2003: Federal Register, November 30, 2001 (Vol. 66, No. 231), 59790-59793, available from 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap03.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
FY2004: Federal Register, November 15, 2002 (Vol. 67, No. 221), 69223-69225, available from 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap04.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
FY2005: Federal Register, December 3, 2003 (Vol. 68, No. 232), 67676-67678, available from 
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/fmap05.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
FY2006: Federal Register, November 24, 2004 (Vol. 69, No. 224), 68370-68373, available from 
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/fmap06.htm; accessed 20 November 2005. 
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The matching structure is particularly important in this program because of its 
relationship to Medicaid. If the program were funded entirely by the federal government, 
there would be a tremendous financial incentive for states to find ways to move their 
Medicaid enrollees into the new program. If the match rates for SCHIP were less 
favorable than for Medicaid, states would have little reason to participate in the new 
program. As designed, the SCHIP match rate is somewhat higher than in Medicaid, 
creating an incentive to shift costs into that program, but with limitations since the federal 
SCHIP allocation for each state is capped.  
Finally, states must use 90 percent of their federal allotments to provide child 
health assistance; in the absence of secretarial waivers to initiate certain community-
based health care initiatives or to use funds to purchase family coverage through 
employer plans, states may spend only 10 percent of SCHIP funds on administration, 
outreach, and enrollment and for broad-based health service initiatives aimed at 
improving child health.16
 
 
Relation to Medicaid 
 
SCHIP has had beneficial spillover effects on Medicaid enrollment for children, 
because its legislation requires states to screen SCHIP applicants for Medicaid eligibility. 
In designing SCHIP, Congress mandated that state have a process to limit SCHIP 
coverage to those children who are only eligible for SCHIP.17  Congress also required 
                                                 
16 Sec. 2105(a)(2).  
17 Sec. 2102(b)(3)(A) 
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that SCHIP programs implement approaches to “screen” children eligible for Medicaid 
and “enroll” in Medicaid those who are determined to be eligible for Medicaid during 
intake and follow-up screening.18 These requirements are commonly referred to as 
“screen and enroll.”  Screen and enroll attempts to ensure that children receive coverage 
under the correct program and that the appropriate Federal matching rate is applied. 
Many states reported higher Medicaid enrollment growth following the adoption of their 
SCHIP expansions because so many applicants for SCHIP are eligible for Medicaid 
(Cohen, Ross, and Cox. 2000; Rosenbach 2003; Selden, Hudson, and Banthin 2004).  
For the states that implemented the Medicaid expansion program, a method 
coordinated with Medicaid was not complicated. On the other hand, for the states with 
separate SCHIP program, coordination with Medicaid was not straightforward. Separate 
SCHIP programs under “screen and enroll” requirement must first screen applicants for 
Medicaid eligibility. Under Title XXI, if a child appears to be Medicaid-eligible, official 
SCHIP eligibility can not be determined until after Medicaid eligibility is first determined. 
Effective coordination may also facilitate retention of coverage when applicants’ 
determinants for SCHIP and Medicaid eligibility change. With changing economic 
conditions, poor families’ income and other eligibility determinants fluctuate 
significantly. By coordinating eligibility re-determination for SCHIP and Medicaid, states 
may help families retain coverage when they need to move from one program to the other. 
 There are several coordination efforts in all state with separate SCHIP programs. 
The most common coordination approach is “simplification of the enrollment process.” 
The tools to simplify the enrollment process are the use of joint applications, combined 
outreach, and shared administration. First, joint application for SCHIP and Medicaid is 
                                                 
18 Sec. 2102(b)(3)(B) 
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one way to screen eligibility for Medicaid and SCHIP from a single application. Of the 
30 states with separate SCHIP programs, 25 indicate that they used a joint application 
with Medicaid (Table 6). The advantages of joint applications are that they are designed 
to prevent applicants from applying duplicate information to multiple offices or 
completing additional paperwork. Also, states with separate SCHIP program use a 
simplified application with fewer questions and verification requirements than traditional 
Medicaid applications. Second, in order to increase awareness among low-income 
families about new SCHIP program and traditional Medicaid, states coordinate outreach 
activities. Twenty-six of the 30 states with S-SCHIP programs report coordinating 
outreach efforts with Medicaid (Table 6). The third approach to coordinate with Medicaid 
programs is to coordinate administrative activities between Medicaid and SCHIP 
program. Twenty-five states report coordinating administrative activities between 
Medicaid and S-SCHIP programs (Table 6), such as eligibility determination, health plan 
enrollment, marketing, quality assurance, and finance. In several states, such as Iowa, 
Kentucky, and Maine, the separate SCHIP program is administered by the state Medicaid 
agency. Some states transfer children between programs when their eligibility status 
changed as a result of administrative coordination. For example, in Georgia, families mail 
PeachCare applications to a central office. A contractor screens each application first for 
Medicaid eligibility, and forwards applications that are potentially Medicaid-eligible to 
the State Department of Medical Assistance for review. If the applicants are determined 
not to be Medicaid-eligible, the contractor is notified, and then completes the eligibility 
process for PeachCare. In Oregon, applications for SCHIP and Medicaid were mailed to 
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the Oregon Health Plan offices, where employees screened the applications first for 
Medicaid eligibility, then for SCHIP eligibility. 
 
 
Relation to private coverage (employer-sponsored coverage) 
 
Because SCHIP targets children with higher incomes, there are concerns that 
these children might be more likely to have access to, or to be covered by, employer-
sponsored insurance. One of the great challenges in designing a SCHIP program for low-
income people is how SCHIP should relate to the voluntary, employer-based system that 
covers most Americans. In fact, for children with income below 200 percent of the 
federal poverty line, 14.3 percent are uninsured, an even larger portion, 34.2 percent, 
have insurance through their employer (Rajan 1998). This section discusses how states 
implementing the SCHIP program attempt to avoid crowd-out of private insurance. 
 SCHIP programs may provide two incentives for families to drop existing private 
coverage. First, SCHIP coverage often has lower costs compared to private health 
insurance coverage; and second, it may provide more comprehensive benefits. Employers 
may also face financial incentives to discontinue dependent coverage or reduce their 
contributions if SCHIP coverage is available for their low-wage workers. The challenge 
for SCHIP administrators is to maximize the number of the uninsured who use the 
subsidy to buy new coverage, while minimizing the number of private dollars from 
employers and families that are withdrawn due to the value of the subsidy. 
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TABLE 6. COORDINATION BETWEEN SEPARATE SCHIP PROGRAMS AND MEDICAID 
 
Program 
Type 
Joint 
Application 
Administratio
n 
Data 
Collection 
Quality 
Assurance 
Service 
Delivery State Outreach Procurement Contracting 
          
Total  25 26 25 25 24 23 18 19 
          
Alabama COMBO Y Y Y Y Y Y - - 
Arizona S-SCHIP - Y Y Y Y Y - Y 
California COMBO Y Y - Y - Y Y Y 
Colorado S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y - Y Y - 
Connecticut COMBO Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Delaware S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Florida COMBO Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y 
Georgia S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Illinois COMBO Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Iowa COMBO Y Y Y Y Y Y - - 
Kansas S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Kentucky COMBO Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Maine COMBO Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Massachusetts COMBO Y Y Y - - - Y - 
Michigan COMBO Y Y Y - Y - Y Y 
Mississippi COMBO - Y - - - Y - - 
Montana S-SCHIP Y - Y - - - - - 
Nevada S-SCHIP - Y Y Y Y Y - Y 
New Hampshire COMBO Y Y - Y Y - - - 
New Jersey COMBO Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
New York COMBO Y Y - Y Y Y Y - 
North Carolina S-SCHIP Y - Y Y Y - Y Y 
Oregon S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pennsylvania S-SCHIP - Y Y Y Y - - - 
Utah S-SCHIP - Y - Y - - - Y 
 
State Program Type 
Joint 
Application Outreach 
Administratio
n 
Data 
Collection 
Quality 
Assurance 
Service 
Delivery Procurement Contracting 
          
Vermont S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Virginia S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Washington S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
West Virginia S-SCHIP Y - Y - Y Y - - 
Wyoming S-SCHIP Y Y Y Y Y Y - - 
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TABLE 6. CONTINUED 
 
 
Source: TableVI.1 in Rosenbach, Ellwood, Irvin, Young, Conroy, Quinn and Kell (2003), 104, available from 
www.cms.hhs.gov/Reports/downloads/rosenbach_2001_5.pdf; accessed 9 November 2005. 
NOTE: The type of SCHIP program is as of March 31, 2001. The state evaluations generally present program characteristics as of September 30, 1999. Analysis 
includes only 30 States with separate SCHIP programs as of March 31, 2000 
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The policy problem is that every dollar of the public program that replaces a 
private dollar already being spent is a dollar that fails to achieve the stated program 
objective of providing health insurance to the uninsured. To the extent that this occurs, 
the decline in the uninsured rate will be smaller and fewer improvements in access to care 
and health status may result. Such substitution may also lead to greater than expected 
increases in program expenditures (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000).  
SCHIP include approaches to prevent the crowd-out of private insurance. The 
methods to limit the degree of crowd-out of private insurance include waiting periods, 
which require that children must be without insurance for a period of time prior to 
enrollment (commonly 3-6 months); monitoring and application questions regarding 
children’s health care, verifying insurance status against databases of private coverage, 
benefits and cost sharing to resemble private health insurance coverage, subsidizing 
employer-based coverage, and imposing obligations on employers or insurers to limit the 
occurrence of crowd-out (Lutzky and Hill 2001). Imposing waiting periods is the most 
common strategy used by the states for controlling crowd out. Thirty-seven states 
required a waiting period without health insurance coverage (Table 7). Of the 37 states 
requiring children to be uninsured for one or more months before obtaining coverage 
under SCHIP, 18 had waiting periods less than 6 months, 17 required a 6–month waiting 
period, and 2 required that children be uninsured for 12 months. Many states report that 
they allow exceptions to the waiting period when a child became uninsured involuntarily 
as a result of circumstances beyond the family’s control (such as layoffs, job changes, 
divorce, or the death of a parent). Eighteen states report that their cost-sharing design 
features (such as premiums, co-payments, or enrollment fees) are explicitly intended to 
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address crowd-out concerns. Six states also incorporate benefit limits or exclusions to 
resemble those in private health insurance benefits packages (for example, limits on 
mental health, durable medical equipment, and therapy services).  
Most states gathered information about current and previous insurance coverage 
to determine eligibility. Not all states used this information for monitoring crowd-out. 30 
states had a monitoring process to assess the extent of crowd-out (Table 7). Thirteen 
states noted that they verified applicants’ insurance coverage information with employers. 
Employer verification typically requires staff to contact the employer, by phone or mail, 
to verify income, insurance coverage status, and other information, and then to review all 
the application information before a final eligibility determination can be made. 
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TABLE 7. FEATURES OF SCHIP PROGRAMS IDENTIFIED TO PREVENT CROWD OUT IN 50 STATES  
AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
 
STATE Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado 
Expansion Type COMBO M-SCHIP S-SCHIP M-SCHIP COMBO S-SCHIP 
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 200 200 200 100 250 185 
Application Questions      ● 
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature `●  ●  ● ● 
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature      ● 
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage       
Monitoring ●  ●   ● 
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers     ●  
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
 ●     
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
      
Waiting Period 3 months 12 months 6 months None 3 months 3 months 
When the Waiting Period 
does Not Apply 
When health insurance 
has been involuntarily 
terminated. 
When income is less than 
150 percent of poverty or 
good cause 
When prior coverage was 
discontinued due to the 
involuntary loss of 
employment 
N/A 
When health coverage was lost 
due to employment loss or a 
change in jobs, family moved 
into an area where ESI is not 
available, employer 
discontinued health benefits to 
all employees, COBRA 
coverage ended, or child 
reached the maximum coverage 
of benefits allowed by current 
insurance policy. 
When employer 
contributed less than 50 
percent of the premiums, 
or prior insurance lost 
due to loss of or change 
in employment. 
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TABLE 7. CONTINUED 
 
STATE Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii 
Expansion Type COMBO S-SCHIP M-SCHIP COMBO S-SCHIP M-SCHIP
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 300 200 200 200 200 200 
Application Questions    ● ●  
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature ● ●   ●  
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature ●      
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage       
Monitoring ●  ● ●   
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers       
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
●    ●  
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
      
Waiting Period 6 months 6 months None None 3 months None 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply 
When coverage was 
dropped due to good 
cause or medical 
insurance is minimal 
When loss for good cause such as death or 
disability of parent, termination of employment, a 
new job that does not cover dependents, change of 
address to a county where provider network is not 
available, expiration of coverage under COBRA, 
or employer terminates coverage for all employees
N/A N/A 
When health insurance 
has been involuntarily 
terminated 
N/A 
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TABLE 7. CONTINUED 
 
STATE Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky 
Expansion Type M-SCHIP COMBO COMBO COMBO S-SCHIP COMBO 
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 150 185 200 200 200 200 
Application Questions   ●    
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature  ●  ●   
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature       
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage  ●     
Monitoring   ●  ● ● 
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers       
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
 ●     
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
      
Waiting Period None 3 months 3 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply N/A 
When insurance has been 
lost through no fault of the 
family, or is inaccessible, 
or does not cover physician 
and hospital services. 
When loss of coverage was 
involuntary or child was 
previously covered by 
Medicaid 
When the cost of employer-
sponsored insurance 
exceeds 5 percent of gross 
family income. 
When prior coverage has 
been lost due to loss of 
employment, coverage was 
dropped by someone other 
than the custodial parent, or 
coverage is not accessible 
because of distance to 
providers. 
When insurance coverage 
has been terminated for 
reasons other than 
voluntary action by the 
child or the parents. 
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TABLE 7. CONTINUED 
 
STATE Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota 
Expansion Type M-SCHIP COMBO M-SCHIP COMBO COMBO M-SCHIP 
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 150 185 200 200 200 280 
Application Questions ●  ●  ●  
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature    ●   
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature    ●   
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage    ●   
Monitoring ● ●   ●  
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers   ●    
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
● ●  ●   
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
●      
Waiting Period 3 months 3 months 6 months None 6 months None 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply None reported 
When the employer contributes less 
than 50 percent of the premiums, or 
the family pays over 10 percent of 
income for family coverage, or the 
child lost coverage for a reason 
other than to get coverage. 
When loss of coverage was 
due to involuntary 
termination. 
N/A 
When insurance coverage was 
lost involuntarily due to layoff, 
business closing, or similar 
circumstance. 
N/A 
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TABLE 7. CCONTINUED 
 
STATE Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire 
Expansion Type COMBO M-SCHIP S-SCHIP M-SCHIP S-SCHIP COMBO 
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 200 300 150 185 200 300 
Application Questions       
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature ● ●  ●   
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature  ●     
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage       
Monitoring  ● ● ●  ● 
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers       
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
 ●     
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
      
Waiting Period 6 months 6 months 3 months None 6 months 6 months 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply 
None 
reported 
When loss of employment was due to 
factors other than voluntary termination; 
employer does not provide dependent 
coverage; expiration of COBRA; lapse of 
coverage when maintained by an 
individual other than the custodial parent 
or guardian; or when lifetime maximum 
benefits under private insurance have 
been exhausted. 
When parent or guardian 
dies; was fired or laid off; 
can no longer work due to 
a disability; has a lapse in 
insurance coverage due to 
new employment; or 
employer no longer offers 
dependent coverage. 
N/A 
When insurance 
coverage 
terminated due 
to no fault of 
applicant. 
When insurance coverage terminated for 
good cause, including loss of 
employment; change of employment to 
an employer who does not provide 
dependent coverage; death of the 
employed parent; employee was laid of; 
or voluntary job loss for good cause. 
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TABLE 7. CONTINUED 
 
STATE New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio 
Expansion Type COMBO M-SCHIP COMBO S-SCHIP COMBO M-SCHIP 
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 350 235 192 200 140 200 
Application Questions    ● ●  
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature ●   ●   
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature ●      
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage       
Monitoring ●  ● ●  ● 
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers       
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
      
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
      
Waiting Period 6 months 12 months None 2 months 6 months None 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply 
When paying for an individual 
health plan or COBRA, or prior 
coverage was lost due to employer 
going out of business, employee 
was laid off, or changed jobs. 
When the child moves out of 
state; is incarcerated in a 
juvenile corrections facility; 
or the child loses coverage 
through involuntary means. 
N/A 
When the child has special 
health care needs or is a 
Medicaid graduate, or insurance 
was lost through no fault of the 
family 
When insurance was lost 
through no fault of the 
family. 
N/A 
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TABLE 7. CONTINUED 
 
STATE Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota 
Expansion Type M-SCHIP S-SCHIP S-SCHIP M-SCHIP M-SCHIP COMBO 
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 185 170 200 250 150 200 
Application Questions   ●   ● 
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature       
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature       
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage       
Monitoring  ● ● ●  ● 
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers       
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
   ● ●  
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
      
Waiting Period None 6 months None 4 months None 3 months 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply N/A 
When the child has a life-
threatening condition or 
disability or was previously 
enrolled in the Oregon Health 
Plan 
N/A 
When coverage 
would have cost 
$50 or more per 
month per family 
N/A 
When lack of insurance is beyond the caretaker’s control; 
the cost of insurance coverage exceeds five percent of the 
family’s gross income; lapse in insurance due to loss of 
employment, temporary unemployment, lay off, or new 
employer does not provide coverage immediately upon 
employment; parent providing the insurance becomes 
disabled or dies; or employer does not provide dependent 
coverage or discontinues insurance coverage. 
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TABLE 7. CONTINUED 
 
STATE Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington 
Expansion Type M-SCHIP COMBO S-SCHIP S-SCHIP S-SCHIP S-SCHIP 
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 100 200 200 300 200 250 
Application Questions     ● ● 
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature   ●   ● 
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature   ●    
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage       
Monitoring  ● ●  ●  
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers       
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
● ● ●    
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
      
Waiting Period None 3 months 3 months 1 month 6 months 4 months 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply N/A 
None 
reported 
When coverage 
was involuntarily 
terminated. 
When insurance is lost due 
to loss of employment, 
death or divorce, or other 
loss of eligibility as a 
dependent under a parent’s 
policy. 
When loss of 
coverage was due 
to good cause. 
When the child has a life threatening condition or disability or 
when loss of coverage is due to loss of employment; death of 
employee; employer discontinues coverage; family’s out-of-
pocket maximum is $50 or more per month; the plan terminates 
coverage because the individual reached a lifetime limit; COBRA 
coverage ends; coverage is not reasonable available; or domestic 
violence leads to loss of coverage. 
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TABLE 7. CONTINUED 
 
STATE West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Total (states) 
Expansion Type S-SCHIP M-SCHIP S-SCHIP  
Maximum Eligibility 
Threshold 200 185 133  
Application Questions    14 
Cost-Sharing as an Anti-
Crowd Out Feature  ●  18 
Benefit Limits as an 
Anti-Crowd Out Feature    6
2
2
1
 
Subsidizing Employer-
Sponsored Coverage     
Monitoring ● ●  30 
Obligations Imposed on 
Employers or Insurers     
Verification of 
Information with 
Employer 
   13 
Pursue Insurance 
Availability of Absentee 
Parent 
    
Waiting Period 6 months 3 months 1 months 37 
When the Waiting 
Period does Not Apply 
When the employer terminates coverage; 
involuntary layoff; private insurance is not cost-
effective; child loses coverage due to parent’s 
job change; or loss of coverage was outside the 
control of an employee. 
When lack of insurance was due to involuntary 
loss of employment; new employer does not 
offer coverage; employer discontinues coverage 
for all employees; or COBRA coverage ends. 
When the parent providing the primary 
insurance is laid off, fired or can no longer 
work because of a disability or has a lapse in 
coverage due to job change. 
 
 
Source: Lutzky and Hill (2001) and TableVIII.1 in Rosenbach, Ellwood, Irvin, Young, Conroy, Quinn and Kell (2003), 49, Available from 
www.cms.hhs.gov/Reports/downloads/rosenbach_2001_5.pdf; accessed 23 September 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter III 
 The Crowding Out of Private Health Insurance of State Children Health Insurance 
Program 
 
Introduction 
 
The issue on crowd-out for private health insurance under SCHIP expansion is 
controversial among policy makers, administrators and researchers, because as income 
eligibility for SCHIP increases more than in Medicaid expansions before, the newly 
eligible children are likely to substitute SCHIP for privately provided benefits. Bansak 
and Raphael (2005) find that between one quarter and one third of the increase in public 
health insurance coverage for SCHIP eligible children is offset by a decline in private 
health coverage. LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) explained that the majority of children 
made eligible for public insurance under the program already had private health insurance 
coverage. One of the behavioral responses to becoming eligible for SCHIP benefits is the 
employer’s response that they encourage employees eligible for public benefits to seek 
public coverage. Employers that are aware that the children of their employees are 
eligible for a new state program may cease to offer health insurance to family members 
and encourage employees to seek public benefits. Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and 
Jensen (2000) examine the mechanism by which crowding out occurs for small firms. 
They find no evidence of employers changing insurance offerings to workers following
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 the expansions. However, they find a negative relationship between Medicaid eligibility 
of a firm’s employees and the take-up rate for health insurance offered by the firm. Our 
study extends the previous literature by using actual SCHIP coverage variable in 2001 
SIPP (Survey of Income and Program Participation) panel to estimate the crowd-out 
effect of private coverage for children who had private health insurance at the first stage 
of the survey and those who initially were uninsured. 
The question of the extent of crowding out of private insurance resulting from 
Medicaid expansions has been controversial with the literature producing a wide of 
estimates from considerable to negligible (Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton 2000; Card and 
Shore-Sheppard 2003; Cutler and Gruber 1996; Dubay and Kenney 1996; Shore-
Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen 2000; Yazici and Kaestner 2000). However, there are 
several constraints that prevent the application of the results from previous literature of 
Medicaid expansions for the new SCHIP. The first potential difference is that the 
proportion of new enrollees into the SCHIP who previously had private coverage is likely 
to be higher than under the Medicaid expansions, as families with higher income are 
eligible for SCHIP. The higher the SCHIP eligibility climbs, the greater the possibility of 
interaction between the public and private insurance markets, the greater the potential for, 
and the more difficult it will be to measure, crowd-out. The second difference is the 
flexibility of SCHIP coverage expansions. The third potential difference is the structure 
of SCHIP programs. States have three options to implement their SCHIP expansions: 
Separate SCHIP, Extended Medicaid and Combined SCHIP.19  States have the option to 
implement their SCHIP coverage expansions through Medicaid (i.e., SCHIP kids use 
Medicaid providers) or through other state-designed plans. Depending upon the structure 
                                                 
19 We provide detailed features of these three SCHIP implementation options in chapter II.  
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of SCHIP programs that state chooses, the extent of crowd out of private coverage could 
be vary from one under the Medicaid expansions. The fourth difference is that states are 
required to develop anti-crowd-out strategies under the SCHIP program. For example, 
many states require mandatory waiting periods following the loss of private health 
benefits before the children in a family become eligible for SCHIP benefits. 
Our study estimates the crowd-out of private health insurance following SCHIP 
expansions for children. We use panel data from the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal household survey designed to provide 
detailed information on the economic circumstances of the noninstitutionalized civilian 
U.S. population. Individuals in the SIPP are interviewed every 4 months about 
employment and program participation during the previous four months, so that changes 
are discovered quickly and even temporary states are not likely to be missed.  We 
contrast observed transitions in coverage for a treatment group of children who newly 
gained eligibility and thus were more affected by the SCHIP expansions with transitions 
for a control group of children who were not affected by the SCHIP expansions. The 
treatment group consists of children who gained eligibility without changes in their 
family income as a result of the expansions, and the control group consists of children 
who either were always eligible or never eligible for SCHIP, again with no changes in 
their family income during survey periods.20
                                                 
20 We define any changes in family income as changes in family income level for SCHIP income 
eligibility threshold during survey period. For example, when a family income was eligible for SCHIP at 
the first interview, and still eligible for SCHIP at the last interview, we consider this family does not have 
any gain or loss in family income. However, when a child was eligible for SCHIP at the first interview, but 
became ineligible at the last interview due to the decrease (or increase) in family income, then, we set this 
child also as control group. Consequently, the treatment group are children who gain SCHIP eligibility 
because of the expanded income eligibility level and remain income-eligible throughout the study period.  
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We find that about 25.7 percent of the transitions from private coverage into 
SCHIP coverage were made by children who would have had private coverage in the 
absence of the expansions.  This paper provides evidence that the SCHIP expansions 
have overall displacement effect of 52.9 percent for private coverage for those children 
who had private coverage or were uninsured from the first interview in 2001. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
Since the Medicaid expansion mandated by Congressional Omnibus Budgetary 
Reconciliation Acts (OBRA) 88 and OBRA 89 has been implemented, policymakers, 
administrators, and researchers have developed a definition of crowd-out. The researchers 
estimated how the extended Medicaid eligibility would affect poor and near-poor 
children and parents using various methods. In many empirical papers for public program 
crowd-out of private coverage, researchers typically compare the reduction in the share of 
the population with private coverage to the increase in the share of the population with 
public coverage due to the expansion. Estimates of crowd-out for Medicaid expansions 
range from zero percent (Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2003) to 49 percent (Cutler and 
Gruber 1996).  The estimate of crowd-out of private coverage in SCHIP by Cunningham, 
Hadley and Reschovsky (2002), who use Community Tracking Study data between 1996 
and 1999, find results that vary from 38 percent to 77 percent. LoSasso and Buchmueller 
(2004) find 50 percent crowd-out of private coverage in children with income between 
100 percent and 200 percent of the Federal Poverty Line. We will present the limitations 
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of two papers on the crowd-out effect of SCHIP in the next sections, and then provide the 
new contribution of this paper.  
 
 
Cross-sectional studies 
 
Cross-sectional studies measure crowd-out that occurred from public coverage 
expansions by examining the changes of insurance coverage of observed populations. 
Cross-sectional studies compare changes in insurance status of specific public program-
eligible populations before and after expansions to that of non-eligible populations by 
using cross-sectional data, and estimate the share of new public enrollees who are likely 
to displace private coverage with public benefits.  
Unlike longitudinal data, the cross-sectional studies cannot detect the direct 
transitions from one insurance coverage to another insurance state at the individual level. 
In fact, because there is no information on why changes in the insurance status of a 
specific individual happens, cross-sectional analysis is limited to observing the actual 
movement of different individuals from private coverage to Medicaid (or SCHIP), and 
from private coverage to uninsurance. 
One group of cross-sectional studies has used pooled cross-sectional data from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) to investigate the effects of Medicaid eligibility 
expansions on the health insurance status of children. An important study in the crowd-
out literature is Cutler and Gruber (1996). The authors define crowd-out in three ways. 
The first definition of crowd-out is the decrease in private coverage as a share of the 
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individuals who became eligible for Medicaid after the expansions. A second way to 
define crowd-out is the decrease in private coverage as a share of the total increase in 
Medicaid enrollment. A third definition of crowd-out is the percentage decline of private 
coverage over time that can be attributed to Medicaid enrollment.   
The authors estimate a multivariate model of the effects of Medicaid eligibility on 
insurance status using the pooled data from the CPS for the years 1988 to 1993, 
controlling for a variety of personal characteristic, geographic and time variables. They 
take advantage of within- and across-state variability of Medicaid eligibility before and 
after the 1988 and 1989 OBRA mandates to study changes in insurance status for the 
newly eligible population of women and children. They find that the likelihood of public 
coverage increases as Medicaid eligibility levels grow over time. They estimate that a 10 
percentage-point increase in Medicaid eligibility increased Medicaid coverage by 2.35 
percentage points and reduced private coverage by 0.74 percentage points. Measuring 
crowd out as the ratio of these two coefficients (definition 2) implies that 31 percent of 
the rise in Medicaid coverage due to the expansions came from private coverage. Thus, 
the authors conclude that these results strongly support the substitution of Medicaid 
coverage for the private coverage.  The authors conclude that between 31 and 49 percent 
of the increase in Medicaid coverage among children was due to a decrease in private 
insurance coverage of children.  
Dubay and Kenney (1996) also use the CPS for 1989 and 1993 to examine the 
extent of crowd-out effects of Medicaid expansions. They attempt to estimate the crowd-
out effect by comparing the change in coverage for the target group affected by eligibility 
expansions with a control group not affected by the expansion. Unlike Cutler and Gruber 
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(1996) or Shore-Sheppard (2003), they focus on two different target populations: children 
from families with incomes below 100 percent of poverty (poor children less than 
11years of age), and children from families with incomes between 100 and 133 percent of 
poverty (low-income children less than 11years of age).  The control group consists of 
men ages 18 to 44 in each of those populations. They estimate that 17 percent of the total 
increase in enrollment among low-income children occurring during the Medicaid 
expansion period  as the result of replacing public benefits with private coverage, and 14 
percent of the increase in Medicaid coverage among pregnant women is attributable to 
substitution of  public for private coverage.  
Shore-Sheppard (1997) uses CPS data from 1988, 1993, and 1996 to study crowd 
out in a manner similar to that of Cutler and Gruber (1996). The author defines crowd-out 
as decrease in private insurance coverage due to Medicaid expansions for low-income 
children, then regresses changes in insurance coverage (private or Medicaid) between 
1998 and 1993 on changes in the fraction eligible between these two time points. Her 
estimate of the percent of children newly eligible through the expansions who came from 
private coverage calculated as a ratio of the coefficients from the private and Medicaid 
regressions, is approximately 15 percent for the period 1988-1993, and 41 percent for 
1998-1996. Her empirical strategy differs from that of Cutler and Gruber (1996) in using 
only the first and last years of the relevant period and not the year-to-year changes in 
eligibility and coverage. This use of long differences may eliminate some fluctuations 
resulting from short-run adjustment effects, but it has the disadvantage of not using all of 
the possible variation, and the magnitude of the estimate is dependent on the endpoints 
chosen. 
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LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) present a national estimate of the effects of 
SCHIP using the CPS data on insurance coverage during the years from 1996 to 2000. 
They use the instrumental variables regressions of insurance coverage to estimate the 
overall effect of SCHIP eligibility on public and private insurance coverage of children. 
They found that the program has a small but positive effect on reducing the percentage of 
uninsured children. They conclude that nearly 50 percent of the increase in SCHIP 
coverage among enrolling children (100-200 percent FPL) is attributable to crowd out for 
private coverage. There are several limitations to this study. First, as the authors speculate, 
this study did not include sufficient variables of state program policies to identify the 
differences among states implementing SCHIP. Second, CPS data prior 2001 did not 
collect any information on SCHIP health insurance coverage. The results estimated from 
only the increase of public health insurance may not be precise without actual 
observations of changes of SCHIP coverage. Finally, as generally with studies using 
cross-sectional data, this paper has difficulties in directly capturing changes in insurance 
status of the same individual over time because the sample of respondents changes each 
year.   
In all four of the above studies, researchers are challenged to disentangle changes 
in private insurance that occur for reasons other than Medicaid expansion, using data that 
were not designed to answer these questions.  
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Longitudinal studies 
 
The previously cited studies use cross-sectional data, which provide snapshots of 
insurance coverage at several different times; however, cross-sectional studies do not 
allow direct examination of change over time. In contrast, longitudinal studies provide 
direct information on how Medicaid expansions affect insurance status changes at the 
individual level over time, thus measuring changes in insurance status more directly. 
This type of study estimates crowd-out by estimating the insurance changes of the 
same persons over a period of time after a Medicaid coverage expansion. However, the 
major weakness of longitudinal studies is the size of the sample available to evaluate the 
public program and lack of state-specific information. 
Two studies examine data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY). Thorpe and Florence (1998) present a different type of analysis of crowd out 
using panel data from the 1989 to 1994 waves of NLSY. They examine changes between 
1990 and 1994, since in this period, enrollment in private coverage was declining for 
many other reasons unrelated related to the Medicaid expansions. They estimate the 
fraction of children newly enrolled in Medicaid in a year who had private coverage in the 
previous year. They measure crowding out as the fraction of children who move from 
private coverage to Medicaid but whose parents retain private coverage. They find that 
between 2 and 23 percent of previously privately insured children who enroll in Medicaid 
had parents who retained private coverage, depending on the year considered and the 
income level of the family. They conclude that 16 percent of the new Medicaid enrollees 
in 1990 and 1994 represented a crowding-out of private insurance. In other word, 16 
 
 50
percent of children newly enrolled in Medicaid had parents who replaced private 
coverage with pubic benefits only for their children.  
Yazici and Kaestner (2000) use panel data from the 1988 to 1992 waves of NLSY. 
They use a difference-in-difference approach to examine substitution. They attempt to 
estimate substitution by comparing changes in public and private coverage for a target 
group with those for control group. Their target group consists of low-income children 
who were newly eligible for Medicaid in second year as a result of the Medicaid 
expansions and had family income loss, and those who are newly eligible for Medicaid in 
second year and did not have family income loss. The control group of low-income 
children consists of low-income children who either were always or never eligible for 
Medicaid in both years and either did or did not have family income loss.  They estimate 
that overall 19 percent of new enrollment of Medicaid coverage was attributable to 
crowd-out. However, the estimation for replacement Medicaid coverage with private 
insurance coverage ranges from 0 percent to 47.4 percent. This wide range of estimates 
results from the various types of treatment and comparison group estimated. For example, 
the treatment group consists of children who became Medicaid eligible because of 
increases in the income-eligibility threshold. In other words, these children’s family 
incomes stayed relatively constant, but because of the higher income eligibility threshold 
they became eligible for Medicaid. For the treatment group, they use children who were 
never eligible and whose family did not suffer an income loss as a control group. In this 
case, their difference-in-difference estimates indicate an insignificant percentage-point 
increase in private insurance and a significant 22.4 percentage-point increase in Medicaid 
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enrollment. Since there was no decline in private insurance coverage for this group, the 
estimate of crowd out is zero. 
Blumberg, Dubay and Norton (2000) use a difference-in-difference approach to 
explain the extent of crowd out of Medicaid expansions with 1990 SIPP longitudinal data. 
They compare changes in health insurance coverage for low-income young children (ages 
1 to 6) living in poor and near-poor families as treatment group to changes in insurance 
coverage for older children (ages 7 to 11)  living in poor and near-poor families as control 
group not affected by Medicaid expansion. They conclude that, for children who already 
had private coverage, about 23 percent of the movement from private insurance to 
Medicaid was due to the displacement of private coverage and the extent of substitution 
of public for private coverage for children who began the panel uninsured was zero 
percent. However, these estimates are calculated using statistically insignificant 
regression coefficients, and thus are likely to be quite imprecise. 
Cunningham, Hadley and Reschovsky (2002) use 1996-1997 and 1998-1999 
longitudinal data from the Community Tracking Study to examine the effects of increases 
in eligibility for public coverage through SCHIP expansions on children’s health 
insurance coverage. By combining data from surveys conducted both before and after the 
implementation of SCHIP, they employ a difference-in-differences approach to examine 
changes in coverage among states that experienced a large increase in eligibility with 
states that experienced little or no increase in eligibility. The parameters for the baseline 
eligibility in their model capture the effects of cross-sectional differences in eligibility 
across states and communities on coverage prior to SCHIP.  Like Blumberg, Dubay, and 
Norton (2000), they use a multivariate model that controls for other factors among 
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children that may be correlated with health insurance coverage across the state. They find 
that SCHIP expansion increased public coverage among SCHIP target group (low-
income children between 100 and 200 percent of poverty). They conclude that 38 percent 
of the increase in public coverage among children in SCHIP target group was the result 
of replacement of private coverage with public coverage. However, this result is 
simulated through the predicted probabilities for each of the 1998-1999 observations in 
their sample, assuming that eligibility remained at 1996-1997 levels. Therefore, the 
significance of their result on crowd-out effect of SCHIP is unknown. In addition, the 
data used for their study capture the very early stages of SCHIP implementation and 
therefore do not reflect the increases in enrollment observed since 1999 (Rosenbach et al. 
2003).  
 
 
New contribution 
 
Our paper extends the previous literature using a difference-in-differences 
approach to examine whether and to what extent the SCHIP expansions for children 
displace private coverage. We compare the health insurance coverage transitions in 
children mostly affected by the SCHIP expansion to children less affected by the SCHIP 
expansion between the first interview and the last interview of the 2001 SIPP waves. The 
previous literature on SCHIP expansions compared the reduction in the share of the 
population with private coverage to the increase in the share of the population with public 
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21coverage due to the expansion without any actual dataset of SCHIP coverage.  It is 
preferable to use longitudinal data when estimating crowd-out effects or take-up rates 
over time in public health insurance programs (Dubay and Kenney 1996; Holahan, 
Winterbottom, and Rajan. 1995). There are many complex factors that can affect the 
transitions of health insurance coverage over the period of SCHIP expansions. Although 
a recent paper (Cunningham, Hadley, and Reschovsky 2002) on SCHIP extension uses 
longitudinal data (Community Tracking Study) to study the effect of crowd-out caused by 
SCHIP, as we mentioned in previous section,  this paper has several limitations, 
especially in estimation on the effect of crowd-out.   
Therefore, the primary contribution of this paper is analyzing actual SCHIP 
coverage transitions among low-income children (especially among the newly eligible 
population) by using 2001 SIPP panel, because from 2001, SIPP data include the 
information of the SCHIP coverage in their survey. These data allow us to directly track 
changes in the health insurance coverage of children during the years of the SCHIP 
expansions. These estimation results provide better measures of the crowd-effect of 
SCHIP while controlling for the effect of other factors affecting coverage decisions by 
separating newly eligible children from the whole population of children.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 In fact, the dataset on SCHIP coverage have collected since 2001.After 2001, none of the 
previous studies have used SIPP data for analysis on public health insurance policy. 
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Theoretical crowd-out effect of SCHIP on private coverage 
 
Consider a family who has a newly eligible child or children for SCHIP 
expansion, deciding on their insurance policy. For simplicity, we assume that a consumer 
purchases an individual health insurance policy and that policies differ only in the 
generosity of health insurance plan.  For example, a consumer who has more generous 
health insurance plan is provided with a greater range of providers or covered with a 
wider set of medical services. In figure 4 through 6, both health insurance and other 
goods are measured in dollar units.  A consumer makes a choice between more preferred 
health insurance policy and other goods.  While people shown in figure 5 and 6 value 
health insurance highly and choose the highest medical services, those expressed in 
figure 4 value health insurance less highly. Prior to SCHIP expansion, a consumer faces a 
budget line for health insurance with a slope of -$1 and -intercept equal to her money 
income.  The budget constraint for her money income of OA is expressed as ABC in 
figures 4 through 6.  
y
Now the government provides consumers public health insurance like SCHIP 
with generosity S. In our paper, because of possible stigma associated with public 
coverage and transaction cost, we set the value of SCHIP below that of private health 
insurance. Indeed, Currie (2003) suggests that the stigma associated with receiving public 
benefits may be larger when recipients are forced to divulge personal information on 
applications. Cunningham (2001) finds evidence that low take-up rates for SCHIP are 
likely due to stigma, lack of awareness. Also, Currie (2003) posits that transaction costs 
per child are likely to be higher for households with fewer children and higher income 
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households that have never received public assistance. Also, private coverage is likely to 
cover the entire family in a single plan. This may mean a parent obtains coverage which 
would otherwise be uninsured, or it may mean that the family can more easily use the 
benefit because of having a single plan.  
Because consumers have no choice to see higher quality providers by paying 
more on the margin, individual consumption of public health insurance is exactly the 
amount S. Thus, the budget line with this new public health insurance is ASBC. Any 
individual who would prefer to consume a higher quality health insurance returns to the 
original budget line, ABC. The theoretical crowd-effect of SCHIP on private insurance 
may be elaborated by focusing on the segments AB and BC of the original budget 
constraint in figures 4 through 6. The maximized consumption equilibrium points of 
equally wealthy consumers of health insurance would be distributed along the whole of 
ABC. Figure 4 shows the group of consumers with consumption-equilibrium points on 
the segment AB. The introduction of SCHIP leads consumers to increase their total 
consumption of health insurance. The income effect of SCHIP would generate higher 
consumption for every member of this group. In other words, consumers with low value 
of private health insurance are likely to drop their private insurance and enroll in the new 
public insurance, SCHIP. For this group of consumers, we have theoretical expectation 
on the crowd-out effect of SCHIP on private insurance. Now, we consider the group of 
consumer valuing private health insurance highly on segment BC. A consumer whose 
indifference curve is both tangent to BC and passes below point S in figure 5 will replace 
private health insurance with SCHIP, because the bundle of goods at S is preferred to the 
best attainable on original budget line, BC. However, the bundle that would be chosen on 
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BC contains more dollars’ worth of private health insurance than does new consumption-
equilibrium, S. People whose indifference curves are both tangent to BC and passes 
above point S will retain their private insurance (figure 6). The introduction of SCHIP to 
this last group of consumer would leave individual consumption unchanged from the 
original level.  
The primary empirical prediction that can be said is that, for any given level of 
income, the larger the amount of subsidized public health insurance, the greater the 
probability that consumer replaces private insurance with public health insurance like 
SCHIP. That is, the larger AS is relative to OA (or OC), the longer AB is relative to BC. 
Also, the higher people value public health insurance relative to the private coverage 
quality, the greater the probability that they are likely to drop their private insurance and 
enroll in SCHIP. However, empirical testing of this theoretical prediction is impossible, 
since we do not know the desired value of the private and public health insurance for any 
individual. Thus, while not estimating the crowd-out effect of SCHIP through the 
underlying individual health insurance demand function, we contrast observed transitions 
in coverage of individuals who newly gain eligibility for SCHIP with transitions for those 
who were  less unaffected by the SCHIP expansions. We will discuss in section III-6 the 
specific strategy for the estimation of individuals’ responsiveness on SCHIP and private 
insurance coverage. 
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Figure 4. The crowd-effect of SCHIP on private health insurance: the case of consumer 
with low values of private health insurance.   
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Figure 5. The crowd-effect of SCHIP on private health insurance: the case of consumer 
with high values of private health insurance, affected by SCHIP expansion. 
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Figure 6. The crowd-effect of SCHIP on private health insurance: the case of consumer 
with high values of private health insurance, unaffected by SCHIP expansion 
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Descriptive evidence and data sources  
Crowd-out of private health insurance will tend to occur in instances where 
eligible an 
ost 
tly, 
s 
rage.  
).  
s 
 under 15 for health insurance type by 
relative
ith 
                                                
 
 individuals find that public coverage is less costly or more comprehensive th
their private coverage. For example, most of the proposed Medicaid or SCHIP 
expansions require little or no premiums or out-of-pocket cost sharing,22 while m
employer plans require employee premium contributions and co-payment. Consequen
some individuals are likely to shift to Medicaid or SCHIP as they become eligible, 
potentially with the encouragement of employers. Perhaps more importantly, person
who enroll while uninsured may continue with the program as long as they remain 
eligible, even if they subsequently become employed in a job that offers health cove
The potential for crowd-out increases as income eligibility levels rise, because the 
percentage of persons with private coverage tends to increase with income (Table 8
Because the SCHIP eligibility income cutoff is higher than for the Medicaid expansion
in their state, crowd-out under the SCHIP program is likely to be greater than under the 
Medicaid expansions. Because ‘screen and enroll’ provisions create a spillover effect of 
SCHIP on Medicaid enrollment, even the degree of substitution in Medicaid coverage 
can be higher than before the SCHIP expansion. 
Table 8 presents the proportion of children
 Federal Poverty Level and year, and changes of proportion for health insurance 
type. Between 2001 and 2003, the overall proportion of children with private health 
insurance decreased by 0.9 percentage points, while overall proportion of children w
 
22 Over half of states require premiums for SCHIP. However, they are generally small compared to 
ESI (Employer-Sponsored Insurance) premiums.  
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public health insurance increased by 1.1 percentage points. Several papers have studied 
the long-term decreases in the percentage of Americans who have private coverage 
(Fronstin and Snider 1997; Holahan, Winterbottom, and Rajan. 1995). In Cutler and
Gruber (1996), they concluded that expanded coverage to children through Medicaid 
contributed to this decline. 
Table 8 also shows t
 
has 
he decline in proportion of children without any health 
insuran  
in 
elow 
e 
ce by 0.2 percentage points. Interestingly, among children with public health
insurance, the proportion of children with SCHIP increased more than the proportion 
with Medicaid by 0.7 percentage points. Among children in families with incomes 
between 100 and 300 percent of the federal poverty level, the proportion of SCHIP 
health insurance coverage increased from 4.4 percent  in 2001 to 5.3 percent in 2003, 
while the proportion of children covered by Medicaid benefits decreased by 0.2 
percentage points. As expected, the proportion of children with family incomes b
100 FPL who have public coverage is larger than that of children in families with incom
between 100 and 300 percent of the poverty line. This initial look at the data suggests that 
concerns about potential crowd out are well founded. Table 8 indicates that while private 
coverage decreased for children in families with all income poverty levels, there are 
notable increases in public coverage.  
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TABLE 8. PROPORTION OF POOR AND NEAR-POOR CHILDREN (BELOW 300 
FPL) 15 AND UNDER COVERED BY HEALTH INSURANCE BY TYPE 
 2001 (%) 2002 (%) 2003 (%) Change (%)
 
Overall FPL 
  Private 
  Uninsured 
67.4 66.9 66.5 -0.9
12.0 11.6 11.8 -0.2
d 
IP 
 and below 300FPL 
67.4 68.2 67.0 -0.4
14.5 14.0 14.0 -0.5
d 
IP 
23.6 20.6 20.9 -2.8
20.0 19.5 19.7 -0.3
d 
IP 
  Public 20.7 21.5 21.7 1.1
       Medicai 17.5 18.0 17.8 0.2
       SCH 3.1 3.5 4.0 0.9
Above 100FPL
  private 
  uninsured 
  public 18.3 17.9 19.0 0.7
       Medicai 13.9 13.2 13.7 -0.2
       SCH 4.4 4.7 5.3 0.9
less 100FPL 
  private 
  uninsured 
  public 56.4 60.0 59.5 3.1
       Medicai 51.5 54.1 53.0 1.4
       SCH 4.9 5.9 6.5 1.6
 
are calculated from 9 waves in the 2001 SIPP lo inal survey da t the 
verage proportion of 3 waves for each year. Individuals in the SIPP are interviewed every 4 months about 
ve.” 
Table 9 presents the health insurance status at the first reference month of the 
2001 S
rst, 
N
a
ote: Figures ngitud ta. We presen
employment and program participation during previous for months. Each 4-month period is called “wa
Overall FPL includes all children. Percentages of change are calculated the difference between 2001 and 
2003. The public coverage is presented as a sum of proportion of Medicaid and SCHIP coverage in this 
table. 
 
 
 
IPP panel for children who are enrolled in SCHIP at the last interview. These 
descriptive figures provide some indication for the trend of health insurance status. Fi
only 40 percent of the children who have SCHIP coverage at the last period are covered 
by public health insurance (25 percent with Medicaid and 15 percent with SCHIP) in the 
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first period. In Thorpe and Florence (1998), 73 percent of children receiving Medicaid in 
1994 were covered by Medicaid in 1993. Second, 26 percent of the children who have 
SCHIP coverage at last period are not covered by any insurance coverage in the first 
period. This rate is considerably higher than the proportion during Medicaid expansio
in 1994. In the study by Thorpe and Florence (1998), only 14 percent of children covered
by Medicaid in 1994 were uninsured in the previous year.  Finally, 35 percent of children 
have private coverage at the first interview. As expected, the share of children in SCHIP 
with initial private coverage is higher than under Medicaid expansions due to the 
increased income eligibility. 
ns 
 
f 
ren 
 
TABLE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN’S INITIAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE AMONG NEW SCHIP ENROLLEES 
 
 Distribution (%) Standard Errors 
23  To obtain descriptive evidence on the crowd-out o
private insurance by SCHIP expansions, we track the health insurance status of child
who reported SCHIP coverage at the last interview and test whether they retain the initial
private coverage.  
 
 
   
Private  
 
34.4 0.475 
Medicaid 24 8 . 0.433 
SCHIP 14.7 0.354 
Uninsured 26.1 0.44 
 
ote: Tabulations from the SIPP 2001 panel. Size of sample is 463 individuals. 
                                                
N
 
23 In Thorpe and Florence (1998), the authors find  that 9.7 percent of children had employer-
sponsored coverage in the year prior to receiving Medicaid in 1994, and 1.9 percent of children had non-
group coverage. 
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Because health insurance coverage is dynamic in nature, we need to observe an 
individ d, 
ge of 
001 to 
has several advantages for studying the question of SCHIP participation 
and the
ach 
y, 
 
types of health insurance coverage status from the reported 
multipl ho 
                                                
ual’s health insurance status over an extended period of time. As previously state
the goal of this paper is to estimate the crowd-out effect of SCHIP for private coverage 
by tracking direct changes in the transition of the health insurance coverage of low-
income children. The 2001 panel of SIPP includes the data for SCHIP health covera
individual. This is a nationally representative longitudinal database that allows us to track 
insurance coverage transitions over the 32-month period during which the SCHIP 
enrollment was growing. 24 The 2001 panel of SIPP covers the period from April 2
December 2003. 
The SIPP 
 crowding out of private health insurance among children. First, unlike other 
surveys that occur annually, data collection of the SIPP occurs three times per year (e
4-month period is called a “wave” and some data sets are collected per month). Second, 
the SIPP provides more detailed data on income and program participation. Consequentl
because the movement between different insurance states can be observed, the SIPP 
dataset can provide answers for certain questions that cannot be answered at all using
cross-sectional datasets.  
We identify three 
e types of health insurance coverage as follows: “Private coverage” as those w
report they are covered by private coverage (private coverage includes children covered 
 
24 Most states began to implement their SCHIP programs in 1998 and 1999. Federal government 
encouraged states to enhance the program through the federal financial contribution to lower the rates of 
uninsurance among low-income children. Enrollment began in January 1998 and increased rapidly over the 
first four years. By December of 2001, the number of children with SCHIP coverage had reached 3.4 
million, and by December 2003, enrollment had increased to more than approximately 6 million children. 
For more detailed information, see  http://www.kff.org/medicaid. 
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by employer-based, privately purchased, and military health insurance); “SCHIP 
coverage” as those who reported they are covered by SCHIP (including those who report 
both private coverage and SCHIP); “Medicaid coverage” as those who reported they are 
covered by Medicaid (including those who report both private coverage and Medicaid); 
and “Uninsured status” as those who reported they are covered by neither private 
insurance nor any public coverage (the uninsured category includes all children for whom 
a specific type of coverage is not reported).  
The Census Bureau does not identify the states of residence for individual from 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Maine in Combination Program; Vermont and Wyoming. 
This information is necessary to impute SCHIP eligibility cutoffs. Thus, our analysis 
sample includes only children whose state of residence is identified. We drop children 
who leave the original sample households interviewed in the first wave. We also restrict 
our sample to children who are younger than 16 years old at the first interview, since 
children above 15 years old are not eligible for the SCHIP program in the last interview. 
In Tables 10 through 12, we present the sample means for initial health insurance 
coverage and other socio-economic characteristics for the treatment group (children who 
gained eligibility as a result of the expansions without changes in family income) and 
control-group (children who either were always eligible for Medicaid or never eligible for 
SCHIP without changes in family income). We used self-reported total family earned 
income relative to the federal poverty line to gauge the income eligibility cutoffs for both 
Medicaid and SCHIP. According to Rosenbaum and Markus (2002), “the majority of 
state plans lacked clarity on the income standards and methodologies they would apply to 
determine eligibility under separately-administered SCHIP programs.” States with 
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separate child health programs often do not clearly define their income eligibility criteria. 
Thus, for consistency and simplicity, we apply the Medicaid income definitions to all 
states. We calculate the income eligibility cutoffs by dividing the self-reported total 
family earned income by the family-size specific federal poverty line for 2001 (first 
interview). We identify treatment group of children eligible for SCHIP benefits by 
identifying children who meet the SCHIP family income criteria and age listed in Table 3, 
but did not meet the Medicaid criteria in the first interview.  
 
 
Methods and estimation strategy 
 
Analytic strategy 
 
We estimate to what extent the children who newly gain eligibility for SCHIP 
substitute public health benefits for private health coverage by examining how health 
insurance coverage of low-income children changes from the first interview to the last 
interview of the 2001 SIPP survey. Ideally, we would draw a sample based on data 
collected prior to the SCHIP expansions, but only the 2001 SIPP data set has information 
on the actual SCHIP coverage variable. According to CMS SCHIP enrollment reports, for 
every fiscal year, SCHIP enrollment increased over 2000 and 2001 levels due to the 
outreach effort of each state.25  
                                                 
25 Annual percent changes of SCHIP enrollment have increased by 47 percent, 27 percent, 11 
percent and 5 percent from 2000 FY to 2003 FY.   
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In order to estimate the net changes of insurance coverage resulting from the 
SCHIP expansions rather than other factors during the period (i.e., individuals’ 
intentional disenrollment from private coverage, loss of income, etc.), we contrast 
observed transitions in coverage for a treatment group with transitions for a control group 
of children. We wish to compare the reduction in the share of children with private 
coverage at the last interview to the increase in the share of the children with SCHIP 
coverage due to the expanded eligibility at the last interview. We use multivariate 
regression models to estimates the determinants of three transitions. This difference-in-
differences approach controls for other factors that affect both the control group and 
treatment group, and measures the extent of crowd-out private coverage in the treatment 
group relative to the control group.  
The three equations consider: (1) the probability of having SCHIP coverage at the 
last interview for children with private coverage at the first interview26; (2) the 
probability of having SCHIP coverage at the last interview among children with 
uninsured status at the first interview; (3) overall probability of having SCHIP coverage 
at the last interview. Note that our estimation procedure does not impose the restriction 
that the probabilities sum to one. 
We estimate linear probability models of the probability that a child with private 
coverage at the first interview had private, Medicaid, SCHIP and no insurance at the last 
interview, and similar models for children with no coverage at the first interview. Then, 
to estimate the extent of substitution of SCHIP for private coverage, we compute the ratio 
                                                 
26 Our sample includes all population who choose any insurance status among 4 categories of 
insurance coverage (Private insurance, Medicaid, SCHIP, or Uninsurance) at the last interview. As 
mentioned earlier, SCHIP (or Medicaid) includes those who report both private coverage and SCHIP (or 
Medicaid). 
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of coefficients (coefficients of the dummy variable indicating whether the child is a 
member of the treatment group or not) from these models.  
 
 
Estimation strategy 
 
We use linear probability models as in Blumberg, Dubay and Norton (2000) for 
estimation. We estimate three sets of linear probability models for the extent of crowd-
out. In the first set, we restrict the sample to children with private health insurance at the 
first interview. Then we estimate four separate equations through the linear probability 
model. We estimate: the probability of choosing private health insurance at last 
interview; the probability of movement into SCHIP at last interview; the probability of 
movement into Uninsured status at last interview of the panel; the probability of 
movement into Medicaid at last interview. The second set is restricted to the sample to 
children with uninsured status at the first interview of the survey and the same four 
equations are estimated. For the third set, we restrict the sample to children with private 
health insurance or uninsured status at the first interview of the survey. Again, we 
estimate four transition equations. With the estimates from the third set, we can compute 
the overall measure of crowd-out for children moving into the SCHIP coverage from 
either private insurance or uninsured status.  
The general structure of the models is: 
  
εβββ ++++= iiii STATEXtreatmenterageerage 1012 )cov|Pr(cov                 (3.1)     
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Where  is observation ’s insurance coverage at the last interview of 
the survey (private coverage, SCHIP coverage, medicaid, or uninsured status); 
 is observation ’s insurance coverage at the first interview (private coverage, 
uninsured status, or both).  variable is a dummy indicating whether 
observation i  is member of the treatment group or not; 
2cov ierage i
1cov ierage i
itreatment
X  is a vector of explanatory 
variables depicting the characteristics of observation i ’s family and demography based on 
information collected at the first interview of the survey, and also includes a dummy 
variable indicating the state’s different SCHIP implement options (Separated, Combined 
SCHIP and Medicaid expansion).  is a vector of dummy variables indicating the 
state in which observation ’s household lives.  
iSTATE
i
In order to obtain consistent estimates, the treatment variable must be, at a 
minimum, uncorrelated with the equations’ error terms. The error terms of each four 
linear probability model is assumed uncorrelated each other for separate estimation.  
In order to calculate the extent of expansion-related crowd-out of SCHIP for the 
children with private coverage at the first interview, we divide the coefficient of 
treatment in the probability equation of having private coverage at both the first and last 
interviews of survey by the coefficient on treatment in the probability equation of having 
private coverage at first interview, but SCHIP benefits at last interview. Similarly, we can 
calculate the extent of expansion-related crowd-out of SCHIP for the children with 
uninsured status at the first interview, we divide the coefficient of treatment in the 
probability equation of having uninsured status at the first interview, but private coverage 
at the last interviews of survey by the coefficient on treatment in the probability equation 
of having uninsured status at first interview, but SCHIP benefits at last interview. 
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Results 
 
Tables 10 through 12 display summary statistics of variables used in regressions 
for treatment- and control- group in three types of coverage at the first interview of the 
panel. Each insurance variable is an indicator for a child’s health insurance status at the 
last interview of the 2001 SIPP panel given their health insurance status (private or 
uninsured) at the first interview of the panel. 
Table 10 provides statistics of variables used in regressions for children with 
private coverage in first interview. 8.25 percent of the sample was in the treatment group. 
Table 11 presents statistics of variables used in regressions for children with uninsured 
status in first interview. 11.26 percent of the observation was included in the treatment 
group. Table 12 shows presents statistics of variables used in regressions for children 
with private coverage or uninsured status in first interview.  8.74 percent of the 
observation was included in the treatment group. In the group of children with private 
health insurance at the first interview, the control group is likely to have more earners in 
their family and two parents. 
In the group of children with private health insurance at the first interview, 82 
percent of the target group and 89 percent of the control group had private coverage at the 
last interview. In the group of children with uninsured status at the first interview, 20 
percent of the target group and 33 percent of the control group also had private coverage 
at the last interview. While the proportion of SCHIP enrollment for treatment group of 
children with private health insurance at the first interview is 5 percent, the control group, 
who may have been less influenced to enroll in SCHIP due to the expansion, have 
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changed health insurance coverage from private coverage to the SCHIP by 2 percent at 
the last interview. In Table 11, the treatment individuals with uninsured at the first had 
chosen the SCHIP by 15 percent, while the proportion of SCHIIP enrollment for control 
group is 7 percent. The 50 percent of the target group children starting in uninsured had 
uninsured status at the last interview while 35 percent of control group was uninsured at 
the last period. 
Table 13 show the results of linear probability model for children with private 
health insurance at the first interview. The coefficient (-0.0063) of being member of 
treatment group is negatively associated with having private insurance in the last 
interviews of the panel. From the this result, we conclude that there is a difference in 
probability of -6.3 percentage points between the treatment- and control-group, and some 
eligible children for SCHIP may have displace the private coverage with SCHIP as a 
simple result of the expansions. The coefficient (0.0245) of being member of treatment 
group is positively associated with having SCHIP coverage in the last interviews of the 
panel and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
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TABLE 10. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSIONS 
FOR CHILDREN WITH PRIVATE IN FIRST INTERVIEW BASED ON COVERAGE 
DURING THE FINAL WAVE 
(NO CHANGES IN FAMILY INCOME DURING SURVEY) 
 
Variables Treatment Group Control Group 
  Insurance Variables 
0.8157     (0.3877) 0.8871     (0.3164)       Private variable 
0.0502     (0.2184) 0.0153     (0.1229)       SCHIP 
0.0394     (0.1946) 0.0306     (0.1722 )        Medicaid 
0.0946     (0.2926) 0.0669     (0.2499) Uninsured 
Demographic Variables   
0.5491     (0.4975) 0.5107     (0.4999)       Male 
0.8165     (0.3871) 0.8422     (0.3645) White 
1991.7     (3.9815) 1992.7     (4.3061) Birth-year 
0.0278     (0.1643)   0.0551     (0.2282) Age 0 
0.1276     (0.3336) 0.1838     (0.3873) Age 1-4 
0.3346     (0.4718) 0.3285     (0.4697) Age 5-9 
0.5101     (0.4999 )  0.4327     (0.4954) Age 10-15 
Family Characteristics   
0         0.0198     (0.1392) No earners 
0.5850     (0.4927) 0.3500     (0.4770)   One earners 
0.3678     (0.4822) 0.5737     (0.4945)       Two earners 
0.6791     (0.4668) 0.8572     (0.3499)   Two parents 
0.0774     (0.2673) 0.0274     (0.1633) Only male head 
   
Age of highest earner 37.0711     (7.5590) 38.2743    (7.1235) in family 
   
Education of highest earner in 
family (above the high school) 0.4528     (0.4978)     0.7177   (0.4501) 
   
Income Relative to Poverty at the 
first interview 1.7078     (0.4832) 3.9850     (3.5053) 
   
  SCHIP implement Options 
0.3269     (0.4691) 0.2269     (0.4188)   Separate SCHIP 
0.4735     (0.4993) 0.5888     (0.4920) Combined SCHIP 
0.1996     (0.3997) 0.1843     (0.3877)   Medicaid Expansion 
2,540,951   28,251,463 Weighted Number of Observation
 
Note: Standard deviations are parentheses. All figures in table present statistics of variables in 2003 final 
interview and are weighted by personal weight variable provided from SIPP 2001 panel. These variables 
are used in our estimation, so individuals who have any changes in family income during survey are 
excluded in this table and estimation. Source: the SIPP 2001 Panel 
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TABLE 11. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSIONS 
FOR CHILDREN WITH UNINSURED STATUS IN FIRST INTERVIEW BASED ON 
COVERAGE DURING THE FINAL WAVE  
(NO CHANGES IN FAMILY INCOME DURING SURVEY) 
 
Variables Treatment Group Control Group 
  Insurance Variables 
0.2021       (0.4016) 0.3304       (0.4704)         Private variable 
0.1459       (0.3530) 0.0716       (0.2578)       SCHIP 
0.1565       (0.3634)  0.2463       (0.4309)        Medicaid 
0.4954       (0.5000) 0.3517       (0.4775)   Uninsured 
Demographic Variables   
0.5173       (0.5000) 0.5313       (0.4990)       Male 
0.7622       (0.4257)  0.7507       (0.4326) White 
1992.0       (3.8919) 1992.8       (4.2861) Birth-year 
0.0350       (0.1837) 0.0501       (0.2181) Age 0 
0.1310       (0.3374) 0.2094       (0.4069) Age 1-4 
0.3514       (0.4774) 0.3262       (0.4688) Age 5-9 
0.4826       (0.5000)  0.4144       (0.4926)  Age 10-15 
Family Characteristics   
0         0.1156       (0.3197) No earners 
0.4788       (0.4995) 0.5161       (0.4997) One earners 
0.4336       (0.4956) 0.2795       (0.4487) Two earners 
0.6176       (0.4860) 0.6372       (0.4808)  Two parents 
0.1561       (0.3630) 0.0690       (0.2535)   Only male head 
   
Age of highest earner 37.6791      (8.5001) 36.8443       (9.7056)   in family 
   
Education of highest earner in 
family (above the high school) 0.2274       (0.4192) 0.3598       (0.4800) 
   
Income Relative to Poverty at the 
first interview 1.1377       (0.3132) 1.7182       (2.5332) 
   
  SCHIP implement Options 
0.2092       (0.4068) 0.1997       (0.3998)   Separate SCHIP 
0.7348       (0.4414) 0.6580       (0.4744)   Combined SCHIP 
0.0559       (0.2298)  0.1423       (0.3493) Medicaid Expansion 
   675,871 5,326,859 Weighted Number of Observation
 
Note: Standard deviations are parentheses. All figures in table present statistics of variables in 2003 final 
interview and are weighted by personal weight variable provided from SIPP 2001 panel. These variables 
are used in our estimation, so individuals who have any changes in family income during survey are 
excluded in this table and estimation. Source: the SIPP 2001 Panel 
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TABLE 12. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSIONS 
FOR CHILDREN WITH PRIVATE OR UNINSURED STATUS IN FIRST 
INTERVIEW BASED ON COVERAGE DURING THE FINAL WAVE  
(NO CHANGES IN FAMILY INCOME DURING SURVEY) 
 
Variables Treatment Group Control Group 
  Insurance Variables 
0.6868       (0.4638) 0.7988        (0.4009)       Private variable 
0.0703       (0.2557)  0.0243        (0.1539) SCHIP 
0.0640       (0.2448) 0.0648        (0.2462) Medicaid 
0.1788       (0.3832) 0.1121        (0.3155) Uninsured 
Demographic Variables   
0.5425       (0.4982) 0.5139        (0.4998)   Male 
0.8051       (0.3961)  0.8277        (0.3776)  White 
1991.8       (3.9643) 1992.7        (4.3034) Birth-year 
0.0293       (0.1686) 0.0543        (0.2266)   Age 0 
0.1283       (0.3344) 0.1878        (0.3906) Age 1-4 
0.3381       (0.4731) 0.2881        (0.4695) Age 5-9 
0.5043       (0.5000) 0.4298        (0.4950)   Age 10-15 
Family Characteristics   
0            0.0350        (0.1837) No earners 
0.5627       (0.4961) 0.3763        (0.4845) One earners 
0.3817       (0.4858) 0.5270        (0.4993) Two earners 
0.6662       (0.4716) 0.8223        (0.3823)  Two parents 
0.0940       (0.2918) 0.0340        (0.1813)   Only male head 
   
Age of highest earner 37.1989      (7.7703) 38.0471        (7.6099)   in family 
   
Education of highest earner in 
family (above the high school) 0.4054       (0.4910)  0.6609        (0.4734) 
   
Income Relative to Poverty at the 
first interview 1.6721       (0.4581) 3.6253        (3.4701) 
   
  SCHIP implement Options 
0.3022       (0.4592) 0.2226        (0.4160) Separate SCHIP 
0.5284       (0.4992) 0.5998        (0.4899) Combined SCHIP 
0.1694       (0.3751) 0.1776        (0.3822)  Medicaid Expansion 
3,216,822 33,578,322   Weighted Number of Observation
 
Note: Standard deviations are parentheses. All figures in table present statistics of variables in 2003 final 
interview and are weighted by personal weight variable provided from SIPP 2001 panel. These variables 
are used in our estimation, so individuals who have any changes in family income during survey are 
excluded in this table and estimation. Source: the SIPP 2001 Panel 
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TABLE 13. RESULTS OF PROBABILITY MODEL FOR CHILDREN WITH 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AT THE FIRST INTERVIEW 
 
 Movement Movement Movement 
into Medicaid 
Movement into Private 
Insurance into SCHIP into Uninsured
    
 
Member of  -0.0063 0.0245** -0.0118 -0.0064 
        Treatment Group (0.0178) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0133) 
     
Age of Highest earner  0.0018 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0014** 
         in family (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
     
College Education  0.0791*** -0.0074* -0.0315*** -0.0064***
        of Highest earner (0.0095) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0075) 
-0.1118*** -1.0173 0.1203*** 0.0089 No earner (0.0419) (0.0151) (0.0313) (0.0327) 
0.0353* -0.0074 0.0186** -0.0465***One earner (0.0190) (0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0158) 
0.0331* -0.0146* 0.0059 -0.0243 Two earners (0.0177) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0149) 
0.0692*** -0.0192** -0.0417*** -0.0083 White (0.0151) (0.0075) (0.0093) (0.0116) 
-0.0034 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0043 Male (0.0073) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0058) 
0.1356*** -0.0155** -0.0350*** -0.0852***Two parents (0.0164) (0.0074) (0.0101) (0.0131) 
0.0524* -0.0145 -0.0157 -0.0222 Only male head (0.0295) (0.0121) (0.0175) (0.0236) 
Income Relative to 
Poverty at the first 
interview 
0.0060*** -0.0011*** -0.0030*** -0.0019** 
(0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
-0.1823* 0.0621 0.0821 0.0381** Combined SCHIP (0.1001) (0.0673) (0.0721) (0.0205) 
-0.0454 0.0400 0.0430 -0.0376***Medicaid Expansion (0.0984) (0.0668) (0.0715) (0.0146) 
-0.5419*** 0.0675*** 0.0795*** 
(0.0244) 
0.3110*** Constant (0.0809) (0.0176) (0.0817) 
     
R2 0.0863 0.0300 0.0682 0.0404 
Number of Observation 7,349 7,349 7,349 7,349 
 
Note: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level. Note: 
Robust standard errors are parentheses and calculated to solve potential heteroskatasticity in the error terms 
of linear probability models. Age variables and STATE variables are included in our estimation. 
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Table 14 shows the results of linear probability model for children with uninsured 
status at the first interview. The coefficient (-0.0712) of being member of treatment group 
is negatively associated with having private insurance in the last interviews of the panel 
and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The coefficient (0.0744) of being member of 
treatment group is positively associated with having SCHIP coverage in the last 
interviews of the panel and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.    
Table 15 provides the results of linear probability model for children with private 
health insurance or uninsured status at the first interview. Being member of treatment 
group is negatively associated (-0.0176) with having private insurance in the last 
interviews of the panel, but statistically insignificant. The coefficient (0.0333) of being 
member of treatment group is positively associated with having SCHIP coverage in the 
last interviews of the panel and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
We conclude from the results that there is some displacement of private coverage 
for children who had private coverage or uninsured status at the first interview, since the 
negative coefficient of being a member of treatment group in the probability model 
predicting whether children would have private coverage in the first and last interview of 
the panel provides that some children with private coverage at the first interview may 
have displaced their private coverage. However, we cannot say that all of these 
displacement of private coverage during the period of survey are attributable to crowd-
out, since some children who displace the private coverage with SCHIP would have 
moved into uninsured status due to the other factors which occurred during the same 
period of expansions, rather than SCHIP coverage expansions. So, in order to calculate 
the extent of displacement of private coverage due to the extensions, we divide the 
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negative coefficient of being member of treatment group with private health insurance at 
both first and last interview by the positive probability that a child would have private 
coverage in the first period but SCHIP coverage in the last period. From the calculating 
from the results for regression, the 25.7 percent of transitions from private coverage into 
SCHIP coverage in group of children with private coverage at the first was made by 
children who would have had private coverage in the absence of the expansions.  
However, there is no evidence that those who had an uninsured status in the 
treatment group at the first stage transitioned to private coverage (or SCHIP) in greater 
proportions than children in the control group to do so. The result from the probability 
model for children who had the uninsured status at the first interview provides there is 
lower probability that a child who started from uninsured status at the first interview had 
private coverage at the last interview, while having higher probability of covering by 
SCHIP program.  
In the group of children who have either private coverage or uninsured status at 
the first interview, the 52.9 percent of transitions from private coverage into SCHIP 
coverage made by children who would have had private coverage or uninsured status in 
the absence of the expansions.  From these estimates we conclude that the SCHIP 
expansions have overall displacement effect of 52.9 percent for private coverage for 
those children who had private coverage or were uninsured from the first interview in 
2001.  
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TABLE 14. RESULTS OF PROBABILITY MODEL FOR CHILDREN WITH 
UNINSURED STATUS AT THE FIRST INTERVIEW 
 
 Movement Movement Movement 
into Medicaid 
Movement into Private 
Insurance into SCHIP into Uninsured
    
 
Member of  -0.0712* 0.0744** -0.0750** 0.1718 
        Treatment Group (0.0395) (0.0312) (0.0347) (0.0442) 
     
Age of Highest earner  -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0015 0.0020 
         in family (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
     
College Education  0.1858*** 0.0002 -0.1311*** -0.0548** 
        of Highest earner (0.0283) (0.0159) (0.0230) (0.0277) 
0.0206 -0.0136 0.1472*** -0.1542***No earner (0.0563) (0.0352) (0.0539) (0.0588) 
-0.0226 -0.0011 0.0937** -0.0701 One earner (0.0432) (0.0300) (0.0387) (0.0464) 
0.0296 -0.0262 -0.0369 0.0335 Two earners (0.0463) (0.0287) (0.0376) (0.0481) 
0.1056*** -0.0162 -0.0450 -0.0444 White (0.0326) (0.0233) (0.0338) (0.0360) 
0.0310 0.0060 -0.0344 -0.0026 Male (0.0229) (0.0146) (0.0222) (0.0248) 
0.0313 -0.0046 -0.0674** 0.0407 Two parents (0.0297) (0.0200) (0.0304) (0.0321) 
-0.0518 -0.0156 -0.1645*** 0.2319*** Only male head (0.0436) (0.0302) (0.0464) (0.0531) 
Income Relative to 
Poverty at the first 
interview 
0.0325*** -0.0070*** -0.0090** -0.0164***
(0.0057) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0057) 
0.5009 0.0417 -0.8347** 0.2921*** Combined SCHIP (0.3719) (0.0559) (0.3725) (0.1030) 
0.7228*** -0.0337 -0.5981** -0.0910 Medicaid Expansion (0.1948) (0.0491) (0.2335) (0.0898) 
-0.0506 0.0189 0.9917*** 0.0400 Constant (0.1965) (0.0533) (0.2353) (0.0945) 
     
R2 0.1810 0.0665 0.1321 0.1127 
Number of Observation 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448 
 
Note: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level. Note: 
Robust standard errors are parentheses and calculated to solve potential heteroskatasticity in the error terms 
of linear probability models. Age variables and STATE variables are included in our estimation. 
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TABLE 15. RESULTS OF PROBABILITY MODEL FOR CHILDREN WITH 
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE OR UNINSURED STATUS  
AT THE FIRST INTERVIEW 
 
 Movement Movement Movement 
into Medicaid 
Movement into Private 
Insurance into SCHIP into Uninsured
Member of  -0.0176 0.0333*** -0.0309*** 0.0152 
        Treatment Group (0.0160) (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0137) 
     
Uninsured  -0.4618*** 0.0476*** 0.1594*** 0.2547*** 
       at the first interview (0.0141) (0.0077) (0.0114) (0.0137) 
Age of Highest earner  0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0006 
         in family (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
College Education  0.1050*** -0.0061 -0.0502*** -0.0488***
        of Highest earner (0.0091) (0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0078) 
-0.0567* -0.0150 0.1445*** -0.0728***No earner (0.0311) (0.0164) (0.0274) (0.0284) 
0.0134 -0.0063 0.0390*** -0.0461***One earner (0.0177) (0.0097) (0.0116) (0.0164) 
0.0255 -0.0158* 0.0062 -0.0159 Two earners (0.0169) (0.0089) (0.0103) (0.0156) 
0.0721*** -0.0202*** -0.0449*** -0.0070 White (0.0137) (0.0077) (0.0102) (0.0121) 
0.0092 0.0027 -0.0086* -0.0033 Male (0.0072) (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0064) 
0.0993*** -0.0128* -0.0417*** -0.0449***Two parents (0.0143) (0.0075) (0.0109) (0.0127) 
0.0148 -0.0159 -0.0615*** 0.0626*** Only male head (0.0245) (0.0124) (0.0180) (0.0234) 
Income Relative to 
Poverty at the first 
interview 
0.0080*** -0.0016*** -0.0034*** -0.0030***
(0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
-0.1898* 0.0686 0.0297 0.0915*** Combined SCHIP (0.1133) (0.0687) (0.0890) (0.0342) 
-0.0450 0.0381 0.0450 -0.0381* Medicaid Expansion (0.1001) (0.0681) (0.0719) (0.0197) 
0.7680*** 0.0102 0.0706 0.1512*** Constant (0.11823) (0.0713) (0.0808) (0.0463) 
     
R2 0.3220 0.0422 0.1561 0.1406 
Number of Observation 8,797 8,797 8,797 8,797 
 
Note: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level. Note: 
Robust standard errors are parentheses and calculated to solve potential heteroskatasticity in the error terms 
of linear probability models. Age variables and STATE variables are included in our estimation. 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter IV  
The Effect of State Children’s Health Insurance on Single Mother’s Labor Supply  
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I provide empirical evidence on the impact of SCHIP on single 
mothers’ working decisions using recent data from the CPS (Current Population Survey). 
Following the Medicaid program expansions during the mid-1980s, there have been 
extensive analyses on how the availability of Medicaid health insurance affects the work 
decision of single women with children. These studies suggest that the Medicaid 
expansion has either no effect or a small effect on the work decision of low-income 
single mothers (Blank 1989; Decker 1993; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2003; Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2000; Moffitt and Wolfe 1992; Montgomery and Navin 2000; Winkler 1991; 
Yelowitz 1995). 
 There is relatively little evidence, however, on the effect of SCHIP on low-
income female-headed households in the United States. One study – Wolfe et al. (2005) - 
examines the effect of Wisconsin’s SCHIP on the labor market outcomes (employment 
decisions and labor earnings) of low-income single mothers, and finds that introduction 
of SCHIP, which started operation in July 1999, affects single mothers’ labor supply. 
Specifically, they found that labor earnings increased by 3 to 7 percentage points with the 
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introduction of SCHIP (BadgerCare). However, this increase was small in absolute dollar 
value-from $72 to $153 per quarter. 
The empirical work carried out here first investigates the hypothesis that labor 
force participation among female heads of households will increase with the increasing 
income limits of SCHIP. We expect the availability of SCHIP to influence labor force 
participation of women with no work history because of the new opportunities to increase 
income while retaining health insurance for children. The increase in income is available 
only when the women start to work, so that labor force participation increases.  
Second, single mothers with low income are likely to work more hours with 
increased SCHIP availability. Because low-income working mothers whose children are 
eligible for Medicaid need not fear loss of health insurance because of increased work or 
higher income, they have incentives to increase their hours worked and thus their income 
with the introduction of SCHIP. This new incentive to seek higher income could lead to 
increases in hours worked. However, if a woman works and has no coverage for her kids 
and has an income just above the eligibility level for SCHIP, she could reduce her hours 
and qualify the kids for public coverage. This would apply to women who earn just above 
the cut off level for the respective program. We will theoretically mention this in section 
4. It is not clear a-priori which effect will dominate.  
Using recent CPS (Current Population Survey) data during 1999-2005, we 
estimate whether the probability of labor force participation for a single mother is 
affected by the SCHIP expansions. In order to examine the extent to which the SCHIP 
expansions affected individuals’ work behavior, we estimate binary choice models of 
labor force participation as well as a model for working hours. The empirical work 
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requires a measure of the change in eligibility requirements; we compute a measure 
suggested by Yelowitz (1995), which is described below.  
 
 
Literature review 
 
There is a very large literature written on the incentive effects of Medicaid 
expansions.  The impact of Medicaid expansion on female labor supply is controversial.   
Winkler (1991) and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) conclude that Medicaid expansions 
lead to a reduction in female labor force participation. They found a negative impact of 
Medicaid expansion on female labor force participation. Yelowitz (1995) provides 
evidence that the effect of the Medicaid expansion on single mothers’ labor supply is 
positive. In contrast, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000), Blank (1989), Montgomery and 
Navin (2000), Decker (1993), Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2003) all find that Medicaid 
expansion has no impact on the work decision of low income single mothers. These 
differences may in part reflect differences in measuring the value of Medicaid benefits in 
each study. Because Medicaid is an in-kind benefit, the proper valuation for a family is 
problematic. In general, there are three approaches in the valuation of Medicaid: 
government cost approach whereby government expenditures per recipient or per eligible 
individual are used, the cash-equivalent value approach, and the funds released approach 
where by in-kind transfers are valued by the funds released for the purchase of other 
good.27  
                                                 
27 The government-cost approach values medical care transfers at the cost of providing them, 
which includes administrative costs. The cash-equivalent approach (utility-value approach) deems that  
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Winkler (1991) used state level Medicaid expenditures per recipient (a per-capita 
spending measure) in her study. Because she used cross-sectional data in her study, she 
could not control for the state-specific and time-specific effects which could be correlated 
with labor market behavior. Also, her measure assumed that the value of Medicaid-
provided health service does not vary across individuals, and is not dependant on the 
health status of family members. Montgomery and Navin (2000) include state level per-
capita Medicaid spending measure in their study. They find small effects of Medicaid 
expenditures on labor force participation, although the effects disappear once state fixed 
effects are included as regressors.  
Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) used a family-specific heterogeneity index to construct 
a measure of potential utilization of Medicaid health benefits. For example, the family in 
poor health places a higher value on Medicaid health service than those with good health.  
This approach is a modified form of the government cost approach (government 
expenditures per recipient), by incorporating individual and family heterogeneity. 
Constructing a family-specific proxy for the value of Medicaid that will capture the 
effects of family members with poor health is problematic. First, those in poor health 
usually have lower productivity than healthy workers. Thus, lower wages lead worker 
with poor health to reduce their labor supply. Second, the indifference curve between 
work and leisure of those in poor health is likely to be steeper than one of those in good 
health. In other words, a marginal disutility of work of those in poor health is greater that 
                                                                                                                                                 
in-kind transfers be valued in a form commensurate to cash income. In other words, what amount of cash 
transfer would leave the recipient equally well-off as a given amount of medical care transfer? This 
approach is the well-known Hicksian equivalent variation. The funds-released approach values medical 
care transfers at the amount of funds released to be spent on other goods. For detail, see Smeeding and 
Moon Smeeding, Thomas  and Marilyn Moon. 1980. Valuing government expenditures: The case of 
medical care transfers and poverty. Review of Income and Wealth 26: 305-324.  
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one in good health. Thus, the coefficient on family-specific proxy could be capturing 
more than the direct effect of Medicaid.   
Yelowitz (1995) notes that valuing an in-kind health benefit such as Medicaid or 
SCHIP is “a daunting task,” because it is so difficult for the proxy to capture the 
unobservable individual-specific features (risk aversion, health status, etc.) that drive a 
recipient’s valuation of an in-kind benefit.  Yelowitz (1995) examines the effect of 
changes in Medicaid eligibility income limits for families with young children on single 
female labor supply and welfare system participation. He has parameterized the 
difference between AFDC and Medicaid eligibility to measure how much the Medicaid 
income limit is increased from the reforms over its previous AFDC level (he denotes this 
as GAIN%). Using data from the 1989-1992 CPS, he finds evidence that expansions in 
Medicaid eligibility led to a small but statistically significant increase in the labor force 
participation rate of single mothers.  
 
 
New contribution  
 
There have been few studies to date on the relationship between SCHIP coverage 
and labor supply. Thus the primary contribution of this chapter is to quantify the impact 
of the expansion of income eligibility limits on single mothers’ labor supply (labor force 
participation and hours worked). These results will provide new national evidence on the 
SCHIP expansion effects. We provide specific evidence that the SCHIP expansions have 
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different impacts on women depending on their marital status (never married, separated 
and divorced single mothers). 
 
 
Theoretical effects of SCHIP on labor supply of single mother 
 
This section illustrates the theoretical framework that explains how SCHIP 
expansions should affect the single mother’s labor supply according to revealed 
preference theory. Assume that utility function is, ),( XLuU = L, where  is leisure and 
X  is consumption of other goods. Further, assume that a single mother faces an after-tax 
wage rate of  for her work effort and denote the price of other goods by .  Figures 
7 and 8 illustrate the predicted effects on single mother’s labor supply decision that can 
be expected to occur based on the incremental expansions of SCHIP income eligibility.  
Figure 7 illustrates the single mother’s initial budget constraint. We assume she has an 
endowment of leisure hours,
Afterw XP
T , and receives non-labor income, M , which may consist of 
her family’s earnings or asset income. We also assume the value of Medicaid and SCHIP 
coverages (V ) is not changed over time and is constant across the consumers. To 
simplify the illustration, assume that her children are not covered by privately purchased 
or employer provided health insurance, and labor supply and job choice decisions of 
other members in her family are exogenous. We also assume in figure 7 that the SCHIP 
and Medicaid provide health insurance coverage only for her children.  Medicaid is 
means-tested at an income limit of , and SCHIP is at an income limit of . 
Medicaid is not taxed for total income less than , but is taxed away entirely for 
medicaidI SCHIPI
medicaidI
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income greater than . In figure 7, this loss of Medicaid coverage occurs when the 
single mother works at least 
medicaidI
after
medicaid
w
MI −
 hours in the labor market.  
Figure 8 shows the effect of SCHIP income eligibility expansion, based on 
increasing the income limit of public health insurance from to , while 
assuming the value of pre-existed Medicaid and the new SCHIP coverage are the same. 
In order to predict the effect on labor force participation and working hours of single 
mother, we need to consider three portions of the her budget constraint. First, consider 
those who initially work an amount of hours in the range 
medicaidI SCHIPI
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
T
w
MI
after
SCHIP , , the second 
portion applies to those who initially working in the range 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
after
SCHIP
after
medicaid
w
MI
w
MI
, , 
and the final portion applies to those initially working an amount of hours in the range 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −
after
medicaid
w
MI
,0 . Consider a single mother initially worked a number of hours greater 
than
after
SCHIP
w
MI −
. If a single mother changes her behavior, the only possible choice is to 
work an amount of hours somewhere in the range
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
after
SCHIP
after
medicaid
w
MI
w
MI
, . If she is 
working an amount of hours less than 
after
medicaid
w
MI −
, the possible bundle set on the budget 
constraint are unchanged relative to the initial budget constraint in figure 7; therefore, by 
the revealed preference, those who initially not  choosing any bundle sets greater than  
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after
medicaid
w
MI −
 would not choose those bundle sets after the income limit increase from 
to . Therefore, we can expect that single mother reduces amount of working 
hours, but still participates in labor force. Second, for single mother who initially working 
in the range
medicaidI SCHIPI
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
after
SCHIP
after
medicaid
w
MI
w
MI
, , income effect of SCHIP expansions drive her to 
reduce working hours when we assume leisure is normal good. However, she will work 
greater amount of hour greater than
after
medicaid
w
MI −
, because these bundle sets is not chosen 
before SCHIP income eligibility expansions, so they will not be preferred after SCHIP 
expansions, by revealed preference. We can expect that single mother reduces amount of 
working hours, but still participates in labor force similar to the first group of single 
mothers. Finally, for those who initially working in the range ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −
after
medicaid
w
MI
,0 , the only 
possible choice for single mother changing her behavior would be to choose an amount of 
hours that would provide earnings that lie between the Medicaid and SCHIP income limit. 
In the bundle sets between old and new income cutoffs, single mother will participate in 
labor market and increase her working hours. If those who initially are not working 
change their behaviors, then labor force participation will increase.  
Based on these effects of three groups of single mothers, we can see that the full 
effect on working hours is ambiguous because while both the first and second group will 
reduce their working hours, hours for the last group will increase. We might expect that 
the aggregate labor force participation will increase, because women in both the first and 
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second groups will stay in labor force, and the last group will join the labor force, if they 
change their behavior at all.   
 
 
Empirical model 
 
 We estimate a reduced-form model of two equations, where we consider labor 
force participation and hours worked of single mothers. The first equation examines the 
binary choice between working and not working. The equation for hours worked is 
conditional on labor force participation. Both equations are functions of socio-economic 
characteristics of the woman and her family, state level variables that measure program 
differences among states and the variable that measures the change in the income limit of 
public health insurance. This variable, constructed by Yelowitz (1995), is described 
below.  
Yelowitz’s GAIN variable measures the increase in the income limit of public 
health insurance from the SCHIP expansion over its previous Medicaid level. We express 
the GAIN variable computed for the mother’s youngest child as a percentage of the 
federal poverty line (FPL). We computed this variable from difference between SCHIP’s 
new income eligibility limit and MEDICAID’s income eligibility limit prior to SCHIP 
expansion.  
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Figure 7. Initial budget constraint for single mother before SCHIP expansions 
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Figure 8. Single mother’s budget constraint facing increased income limit after SCHIP 
expansion. ( > ) SCHIPI medicaidI
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The income limits of both SCHIP and Medicaid are also expressed as a percentage of the 
FPL. This is formulated as following: 
 
)0  ,      (          
% '
LimityEligibilitIncomeMedicaidLimityEligibilitIncomeSCHIPMax
GAINsYelowitz
−
=
     (4.1) 
 
 
Labor force participation equation  
 
Consider a latent variable  which determines participation in the labor market.  
The labor force participation decision is given by the following expression: 
*
istE
 
igstgstiigstigst KIDAGESTATETIMEXGAINE εββββββ ++++++= 543210*          (4.2)   
                                        
0  E if  0           
0   E if  1
*
*
<
≥=
igst
igstigstE
 
where i  indexes individuals, g  indexes the youngest child’s age, s  indexes states, 
and  t  indexes time period, and  denotes the binary dependent variable that indicates 
labor force participation. The  variable is the explanatory variable of primary 
interest: we hypothesize that it has a positive coefficient (
igstE
igstGAIN
1β >0) for single mothers’ 
employment.  The vector  includes measures such as mother’s age and its square, 
mother’s years of education and its square, a race indicator variable, number of children 
under six, a dummy variable to distinguish marital status (divorced, separated) and  
iX
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whether the residence is in a central city. Dummy variables for time, state, and youngest 
child’s age are represented by TIME, STATE, and KIDAGE. We assume that error term 
 is normally distributed with mean zero and unit variance.  igstε
The probability of single mother’s labor force participation is shown as: 
 
)(  -  1   
)(Pr  
)0(Pr)1(Pr
543210
543210
*
gstiisgt
gstiisgtigst
igstigst
KIDAGESTATETIMEXGAIN
KIDAGESTATETIMEXGAINob
EobEob
ββββββ
ββββββε
−−−−−−Φ=
−−−−−−>=
>==
    (4.3) 
where is the cumulative normal density function for  . )(•Φ igstε
 
 
Working-hours equation  
 
The reduced-form working-hours equation is given by: 
 
                                    (4.4)        
igstigstgs
tiigstigst
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++++
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where  is observed annual hours worked. igstWH
Estimation of equation (4.4) is complicated because the sample consists of only 
women who have chosen to participate in the labor force. The sample of working women 
cannot be considered a random sample from the population; for example, it is likely that 
 
 93
individuals who are observed working are also likely to work longer hours that an 
average individual drawn from the full population.  
This selection issue was first addressed by Heckman (1980), who suggested a 
two-step model of hours worked to provide consistent estimates of this structural 
equation. The first step involves estimating a labor force participation equation which can 
then be used to derive a sample selection correction. The decision to work as given by 
(4.2), is estimated using probit. Next, a selectivity variable, L , is constructed using the 
parameter estimates from (4.2) following Heckman (1980). L  is subsequently included 
as an additional regressor in the second step hours equation (4.4), and parameter 
estimates of the variables in (4.4) are obtained by maximizing a likelihood function with 
respect to the parameter vector.  
We would anticipate that the effect of the SCHIP expansion varies across states 
and over time, because other economic variables in the environment changed 
simultaneously with the expansion.  For example, macroeconomic conditions that could 
be uncorrelated with SCHIP expansion could provide single mothers with incentives to 
participate in the labor market. In order to identify the causal effects of the expansion, we 
must control for systematic shocks to the labor market conditions of the low-income 
single mothers. The Difference-in-Differences estimator can be used to control for this 
identification problem. First, we include state dummies, to capture the state-specific 
macroeconomic trends (state-specific labor market conditions) which are correlated with 
the implementation of SCHIP and to control for state variations in SCHIP policy (out-
reach effort, anti-crowding-out policy,28 etc.). Second, we include year effects, to capture 
                                                 
28 The SCHIP program requires approaches designed to prevent the crowd-out of private 
insurance. The methods used by states to limit the degree of crowd-out of private insurance are waiting 
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the effect of the national average trend in employment of low-income single mothers. 
Third, in order to capture the different responses to eligibility expansion that vary across 
children’s age within low-income single mother families, we use the youngest child’s age 
dummy variable in our estimation. For example, we believe that unobservable economic 
shocks could have affected labor-market outcomes for low-income single mothers with 
older children more than mothers with younger children. Finally, interactions between 
STATE and TIME control unobserved “time-varying-state- specific” factors that could be 
correlated with single mothers’ employment and worked hours decisions. By including 
these interaction variables of STATE and TIME in our estimation equations, we can 
obtain the difference-in-differences estimates.29
 
 
Data and descriptive evidence 
 
The data set, which consists of repeated cross sections, was constructed using the 
March Current Population Survey (CPS), from the years 1999 to 2005. These years 
                                                                                                                                                 
periods, which is the requirement that children be without insurance for commonly 3-6 months; monitoring 
and application questions regarding children’s health care; verifying insurance status against databases of 
private coverage; cost sharing; subsidizing employer-based coverage; and imposing obligations on 
employers or insurers to limit the occurrence of crowd-out (Lutzky, Amy Westpfahl  and Ian Hill. 2001. 
Has the jury reached a verdict? States’ early experience with crowd-out under SCHIP. Washington, D.C.: 
The Urban Institute, 47.) Imposing waiting periods is the most common strategy used by the states for 
controlling crowd out. Monitoring crowd out and posing application questions about health insurance status 
are the second-most common strategies employed by states to address crowd-out concerns. 
 
29 Recent studies (Gruber, Jonathan. 1994. The incidence of mandated maternity benefits. 
American Economic Review LXXXIV: 622-641., Gruber, Jonathan  and James Poterba. 1994. Tax 
incentives and the decision to purchase health insurance: Evidence from the self-employed. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics CIX: 701-733., Yelowitz, Aaron. 1995. The Medicaid notch, labor supply and 
welfare participation: Evidence from eligibility expansion. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 4: 
909-940., and LoSasso, Anthony T.  and Thomas C.  Buchmueller. 2004. The effect of the state children’s 
health insurance programs on health insurance coverage. Journal of Health Economics 23: 1059-1082.take 
this approach in their studies.  
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covered the period when the SCHIP expansions occurred. Information on labor force 
participation and welfare participation refer to the prior calendar year. The single 
mother’s age is restricted to between 18 and 55 years. These women have at least one 
child under 18 to provide a sample of potentially financially independent women. The 
final sample consists of 41,714 single mothers. For the purposes of this study, single 
mothers were defined as those who were divorced, separated, or never married.  
We first examine the distribution of income for those who have SCHIP benefits. 
Expanding income eligibility levels for public health insurance through SCHIP will 
theoretically tend to lead single mothers to increase their working hours, because there 
are no more fears about losing health coverage when income cutoffs are exceeded. On the 
other hand, the SCHIP expansion could lead to single mothers whose earned income 
exceeds the SCHIP threshold to reduce their working hours in order to qualify for SCHIP. 
If these expectations are reasonable, single mothers who are now using SCHIP benefits 
will have the incentive to work up to SCHIP eligible income levels. Thus the distribution 
of SCHIP families’ income level should be capped below the SCHIP eligible income 
cutoff. Using the CPS data from 1999 to 2005, we investigate the distribution of SCHIP 
families’ income levels relative to each state’s eligibility cutoffs. We sort the states by the 
income eligibility levels (FPL150, 185, 200, 250 and 300) based on Federal Fiscal Year 
2001. The poverty ratio of income to low-income level provided by CPS ranges from 1 to 
12 (Table 16). 
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TABLE 16. THE POVERTY RATIO OF INCOME TO LOW-INCOME LEVEL 
PROVIDED BY CPS 
 
Category Poverty Ratio 
Level 1 under 0.50 
Level 2 0.50~0.74 
Level 3 0.75~0.99 
Level 4 1.00~1.24 
Level 5 1.25~1.49 
Level 6 1.50~1.74 
Level 7 1.75~1.99 
Level 8 2.00~2.49 
Level 9 2.50~2.99 
Level 10 3.00~3.49 
Level 11 3.50~3.99 
Level 12 4.00~4.49 
 
 
 
Figures 9 through 19 illustrate the distribution of the ratio of income to low-
income level for SCHIP families. In Figure 10, Figure 18 and 19, we find evidence that 
the SCHIP families living in states with income cutoffs of FPL 185 and 300, tend to 
cluster just below their SCHIP eligibility income levels. For other SCHIP families, 
income distributions appear to be capped below their SCHIP cutoff, rather than clustered 
just below the thresholds. This descriptive evidence yields some expectation that 
expanding public health coverage through the SCHIP could result in increases of single 
mother’s working hours and probability of being employed. 
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Table 17 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the estimation. 
Fully 82 percent of single mothers participated in the labor force, and single mothers 
worked an average of approximately 1422 hours for each year. Annual hours worked are 
calculated by usual weekly hours last year multiplied by weeks worked last year. About 
20 percent of single mothers in this sample did not complete high school. Table 18 shows 
that there are observable differences among divorce, separated and never married single 
mothers. The divorced mothers are older and more likely to participate in labor force than 
separated or never married mothers. Table 18 also shows that never married mothers are 
likely to work less than divorced mothers by about 400 hours of work for each year. Due 
to these differences according to marital status, we include dummy variables for marital 
status in our estimation. Based on the apparently low work incentives of never married 
single mothers, we speculate that SCHIP expansion could have larger impacts on never 
married single mothers’ employment and working hours decision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98
 TABLE 17. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 Mean Standard Error
Employment Status (1 if usual weekly 
hours last year>0; 0 otherwise) 0.815 0.388
Annual hours worked (usual weekly hours 
last year × weeks worked last year) 1421.595 920.855
GAIN Variable 86.233 51.760
 
Mother's age 34.358 8.861
Youngest child's age 7.585 5.320
Oldest child's age 10.342 5.955
 
Number own child under age 6 0.521 0.706
Number of persons in family 2.916 1.115
 
Dummy variable for Education (1 if 
educational attainment>highschool 
diploma) 
0.805 0.396
 
Black 0.243 0.428
White 0.703 0.457
 
Central City 0.311 0.463
Northeast 0.208 0.406
Midwest 0.223 0.416
South 0.321 0.467
West 0.248 0.432
 
Dummy variable for Marital 
Status=Divorce 0.406 0.490
Dummy variable for Marital 
Status=Separated 0.143 0.349
Dummy variable for Marital Status=Never 
married 0.451 0.498
 
 
Total Number of observations 41,714
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TABLE 18.  SUMMARY STATISTICS BY MARITAL STATUS. 
 
 Divorced Separated Never Married
Employment Status (1 if usual weekly 
hours last year>0; 0 otherwise) 0.880 0.805 0.759
Annual hours worked (usual weekly hours 
last year × weeks worked last year) 1654.314 1379.219 1225.617
GAIN Variable 92.580 92.214 78.622
  
Mother's age 38.924 36.313 29.628
Youngest child's age 9.972 7.944 5.322
Oldest child's age 12.822 11.818 7.641
  
Number own child under age 6 0.261 0.483 0.766
Number of persons in family 2.890 3.255 2.831
  
Dummy variable for Education (1 if 
educational attainment>highschool 
diploma) 
0.898 0.751 0.738
  
Black 0.120 0.210 0.363
White 0.832 0.737 0.578
  
Central City 0.223 0.337 0.382
Northeast 0.192 0.226 0.216
Midwest 0.243 0.156 0.223
South 0.303 0.341 0.331
West 0.262 0.275 0.227
  
  
Total Number of observations 16,929 5,974 18,811
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Figure 9. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is 
FPL150 for federal fiscal year 2001 (Idaho, Montana and South Carolina) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 48. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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Figure 10. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is FPL 
185 for federal fiscal year 2001 (Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 187. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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Figure 11. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is FPL 
200 for federal fiscal year 2001 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 219. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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Figure 12. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is FPL 
200 for federal fiscal year 2001 (District of Columbia, Florida and Hawaii) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 197. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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 FPL Figure 13. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is
200 for federal fiscal year 2001 (Indiana, Iowa, Kansas and Kentucky) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 158. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
 
 
 
 105
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
0 50 100 150 200 250
SCHIP Income Cutoff 
(FPL200) 
Poverty Ratio 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is FPL 
200 for federal fiscal year 2001 (Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada and North Carolina) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 259. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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 FPL Figure 15. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is
200 for federal fiscal year 2001 (Ohio and Pennsylvania) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 142. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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Figure 16. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is FPL 
200 for federal fiscal year 2001 (South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 235. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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Figure 17. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP income eligibility cutoff is FPL 
250 for federal fiscal year 2001 (California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 432. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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Figure 18. Distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families: SCHIP Income Eligibility Cutoff is FPL 
300 for Federal Fiscal Year 2001 (Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont) 
 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is 
“1.00~1.24,” level 5 is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 
11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is “4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 222. 
The total number of observation used for these figures is 2099. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL150 are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina (number of 
observation is 48). States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL185 are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin (number of observation is 187). States with 
SCHIP cutoffs of FPL200 (number of observation is 1210) are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina Ohio, Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia and West Virginia. States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL250 are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington (number of observation is 432). 
States with SCHIP cutoffs of FPL300 are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire and Vermont (number of observation is 222). 
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Figure 19. Changes in distribution of ratio of income to low-income level (poverty) for SCHIP families:SCHIP income eligibility 
cutoff is FPL 150 through FPL 300 for federal fiscal year 2001 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement. 1999~2005 
Note: Poverty ratio of income to low-income level ranges from 1 to 12: level 1 indicates “under 0.50, level 2 is “0.50~0.74,” level 3 is “0.75~0.99,” level 4 is “1.00~1.24,” level 5 
is “1.25~1.49,” level 6 is “1.50~1.74,” level 7 is “1.75~1.99,” level 8 is “2.00~2.49,” level 9 is “2.50~2.99,” level 10 is “3.00~3.49,” level 11 is “3.50~3.99” and level 12 is 
“4.00~4.49.” Total observation used for this figure is 2099. States for SCHIP Cutoff FPL150 (number of observation=48) are Idaho, Montana and South Carolina. States for 
SCHIP Cutoff FPL185 (number of observation=187) are Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin. States for SCHIP Cutoff FPL200 (number of observation=1210) 
are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas and Delaware District of Columbia, Florida and Hawaii Indiana, Iowa, Kansas and Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Nevada and North Carolina Ohio and Pennsylvania South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia. States for SCHIP Cutoff FPL250 (number of 
observation=432) are California, New York, Rhode Island and Washington. States for SCHIP cutoff FPL300 (number of observation=222) are Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, 
New Hampshire and Vermont. 
 
 
 111
Results 
 
In Table 19, we present the results of estimating the Probit employment equation 
(columns 1-2) and Heckman two-step procedure of working-hours equation (columns 3-
4) both with and without STATE*TIME interaction terms. The results indicate that there 
are statistically significant effects of the SCHIP expansion on single mothers’ working 
hours, based on the coefficient estimate on the GAIN variable. The effect of the SCHIP 
on single mothers’ labor force participation, however, though statistically insignificantly 
positive, is trivially small.  
The estimated change from the SCHIP expansion is calculated by comparing the 
actual average of working hours per year from 1999 to 2005 for the sample with the 
predicted working hours when GAIN variable is at equal to zero.30 The result shows that 
the SCHIP expansion in income eligibility increases the single mothers’ working hours 
by approximately 3.3 percent (3.2 percent without state and time interaction term). Table 
19 also shows simulated effect of the SCHIP expansion on single mothers’ working hours 
by increasing the GAIN variable 20 percent above its current level. This simulation 
increases the single mothers’ working hours by 3.9 percent with or 3.3 percent without 
state and time interaction. 31
                                                 
30 The estimated change from SCHIP expansion in 1999 through 2005 was calculated as;   
 
HoursWorkingofAverage
GAINofAverageGAINoftCoefficienEstimatedHoursWorkingpredictedHoursWorkingofAverage
   
%)          (   ×−−
. 
 
 The predicted working hours without STATE*TIME is 1763.93 hours. The average of GAIN% for sample 
participated in labor market is 86.2331.  
 
31 The simulated change from the SCHIP expansion by increasing 20 percent GAIN variable 
above its current level was calculated as: 
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Estimated coefficients for the other variables are similar in significance and sign 
to Winkler (1991) and Yelowitz (1995). The number of own children under age 6 in the 
family, central city indicators, the number of person in the family, the square of the 
mother’s age have negative and statistically significant effects on single mother’s labor 
force participation and working hours. The mother’s age, education indicator, white and 
divorced (marital status) variables have positive and statistically significant effects on 
single mothers’ employment and working hours.   
Because the data show meaningful differences in the characteristics of single 
mothers stratified by marital status, it is important to ask whether there are differences in 
the responses of these women to the SCHIP expansions. One might anticipate that the 
never-married single mothers would be more sensitive to the income eligibility expansion 
because single mothers who are either separated or divorced are more likely to have 
health insurance coverage for the children through the absent father. 32 Therefore, the 
extent of income eligibility through SCHIP might not be as important for this group. In 
addition, from the Table 18, we see that never married status could proxy for lower 
income prospects. The never married single mothers tend to be younger, lower-educated 
and less likely to be working women, compared to previously married single mothers.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
HoursWorkingofAverage
GAINofAverageGAINoftCoefficienEstimatedHoursWorkingpredictedHoursWorkingofAverage
   
)2.1%         (   − − × ×
 
32 Yelowitz (1995) reported that only 6.3 percent of never married women have health insurance 
coverage through an absent father, compared with 22 percent of separated women and 34 percent of 
divorced women.  
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TABLE 19. REGRESSION RESULTS OF PROBABILITY OF WORKING AND 
HOURS OF WORK 
 
Probit model Regression 
Coefficients Heckman two-step procedure (Dependent Variable: (Dependent Variable:  Working Hours) Labor force Participation)  
     
0.0007** 0.0005 0.6486*** 0.6853*** GAIN Variable 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.1525) (0.1700)  
     
Estimated change from the 
SCHP expansion in 1999 
through 2005 
N/A N/A 0.0317 0.0326 
     
Simulated change from the 
SCHIP expansion by increasing 
20 percent GAIN variable 
above its current level 
N/A N/A 0.0381 0.0391 
     
0.0661*** 0.0671*** 80.1125*** 77.9213*** Mother's age 
(0.0069) (0.0069) (5.2258) (5.2597)  
-0.0971*** -0.0987*** -92.4019*** -89.3876***Mother's age²/100 
(0.0094) (0.0095) (7.3956) (7.4385)  
-0.1429*** -0.1456*** -53.4362*** -47.3158***Number of own child < age 6 
(0.0142) (0.0144) (11.7270) (11.9200)  
-0.0522*** -0.0514*** -23.5185*** -22.0193***Number of person in family 
(0.0072) (0.0072) (4.9001) (4.9360)  
0.6070*** 0.6100*** 186.4823*** 164.8276***Education 
(0.0181) (0.0182) (42.7837) (42.9758)  
-0.1166*** -0.1138*** -0.9059 -0.9456 Central City 
(0.0178) (0.0179) (11.0900) (11.1677)  
0.2132*** 0.2206*** 70.0680*** 65.0022*** White 
(0.0339) (0.0340) (21.4270) (21.5762)  
0.1439*** 0.1443*** 65.5869*** 60.7853*** Divorced 
(0.0240) (0.0240) (12.9511) (13.0559)  
-0.0667*** -0.0674*** 41.4390*** 41.7533*** Never married 
(0.0235) (0.0236) (12.9511) (12.4555)  
-0.1312 -0.1392 -154.2494*** -23.4690 Northeast 
(0.1090) (0.1356) (48.4207) (131.6439)  
-0.1964 -0.1930 -8.9870 -51.1099 Constant 
(0.1450) (0.1467) (142.356) (156.3622)  
     
STATE*TIME No Yes No Yes 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observation is 41,714. STATE, TIME, KIDAGE 
indicators are included in all specifications. *** indicates significant at the 99 percent level. The estimated 
and simulated changes in labor force participation equation is not available due to the statistically 
insignificant results of estimation.  
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Tables 20 through 22 present the results for the equation re-estimated with the 
sample stratified by marital status (never married, separated and divorced status). These 
equations include the same explanatory variables as in the primary models in Table 19. 
Interestingly, we found that the SCHIP expansions have strong impacts on never married 
single women in both labor participation and working hours equation, and virtually no 
effect on previously married women in labor participation equation. The second rows of 
Table 20 shows that the SCHIP expansion in income eligibility increases the single 
mothers’ working hours by approximately 4 percent (5.2 percent with STATE*TIME 
interaction term), and increase labor force participation by 1.8 percent (1.7 percent with 
STATE*TIME interactions). The third row of Table 20 presents the simulated effect of 
the SCHIP expansion on single mothers’ working hours and labor force participation by 
increasing the GAIN variable 20 percent above its current level. This simulation yields 
the results that single mothers’ working hours increase by 4.7 percent without or 6.2 
percent with STATE*TIME interactions, and labor force participation increases by 2.1 
percent without or 2.0 percent with STATE*TIME interactions. Similar to the results  
reported in Yelowitz (1995), coefficients on the GAIN variables in labor force 
participation for separated or divorce single mothers are statistically insignificant and 
negative, and whereas coefficients on the GAIN variables in the working hour equation 
for separated women are insignificant and positive.  
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TABLE 20. REGRESSION RESULTS OF PROBABILITY OF WORKING AND 
HOURS OF WORK (NEVER MARRIED SINGLE MOTHERS) 
 
Probit model Regression 
Coefficients Heckman two-step procedure (Dependent Variable: (Dependent Variable:  Working Hours) Labor force Participation) 
     
0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.8078*** 1.0236*** GAIN Variable 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.3056) (0.3300)  
     
Estimated change from the 
SCHP expansion in 1999 
through 2005 
0.1760 0.1661 0.0395 0.0520 
     
Simulated change from the 
SCHIP expansion by increasing 
20 percent GAIN variable 
above its current level 
0.2112 0.1992 0.0474 0.0624 
     
0.0890*** 0.0923*** 127.0466*** 123.2889*** Mother's age 
(0.0097) (0.0095) (10.5500) (10.6415)  
-0.1342*** -0.1390*** -161.9346*** -157.1636*** Mother's age²/100 
(0.0143) (0.0144) (15.8179) (15.9594)  
-0.1107*** -0.1114*** -57.5372*** -51.6046*** Number of own child < age 6 
(0.0188) (0.0192) (15.8319) (16.0481)  
-0.0492*** -0.0490*** -35.9771*** -31.9545*** Number of person in family 
(0.0101) (0.0102) (7.8513) (7.8611)  
0.5946*** 0.6008*** 321.9107*** 301.1099*** Education 
(0.0238) (0.240) (68.8837) (69.9023)  
-0.1224*** -0.1168*** -18.0500 -13.2935 Central City 
(0.0245) (0.0248) (18.2266) (18.2300)  
0.2962*** 0.2906*** 142.5008*** 147.1264*** White 
(0.0477) (0.0480) (41.4217) (41.6312)  
-0.0488* 0.4811 -190.5672** -598.5678** Northeast 
(0.1662) (0.2829) (92.3454) (265.1376)  
-0.6131** -0.6742*** -984.2004*** -1056.656*** Constant 
(0.1992) (0.1997) (266.5319) (287.2127)  
     
     
18,811 18,754 18,811 18,811 Number of Observation 
     
No Yes No Yes STATE*TIME 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. STATE, TIME and KIDAGE indicators are included in all 
specifications. ***, **, * indicates significant at the 99 percent, 95 percent and 90 percent level.  
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TABLE 21. REGRESSION RESULTS OF PROBABILITY OF WORKING AND 
HOURS OF WORK (SEPARATED SINGLE MOTHERS) 
 
Probit model Regression 
Coefficients Heckman two-step procedure (Dependent Variable: (Dependent Variable:  Working Hours) Labor force Participation) 
     
-0.0008 -0.0012 0.7596* 0.4502 GAIN Variable 
(0.0008 (0.0009) (0.4604) (0.5245)  
     
0.0825*** 0.0839*** 37.9251* 40.0310** Mother's age 
(0.0208 (0.0217) (18.5779) (18.9714)  
-0.1209*** -0.1231*** -40.5396 -43.4712 Mother's age²/100 
(0.0275 (0.0286) (26.3582) (26.9447)  
-0.1549*** -0.1683*** -106.2451*** -115.5052*** Number of own child < age 6 
(0.0361 (0.0378) (35.3147) (36.3890)  
-0.0909*** -0.0921*** -29.5300 -36.3555** Number of person in family 
(0.0163 (0.0167) (19.6407) (20.1371)  
0.4501*** 0.4601*** 164.1791* 196.3608** Education 
(0.0443 (0.0454) (90.4763) (93.1005)  
-0.1181* -0.1169 -22.0780 -41.3555 Central City 
(0.0451 (0.0465) (31.5000) (32.2000)  
0.0933 0.1163 -37.4601 -10.7531 White 
(0.0901 (0.0906) (48.7227) (49.3462)  
0.0215 -0.3366 270.1500 203.6593 Northeast 
(0.3519 (0.3994) (158.6399) (335.7915)  
-0.0651 -0.0838 914.7057** 565.9561 Constant 
(0.4434 (0.4609) (404.5925) (448.2776)  
     
     
5971 5766 5974 5974 Number of Observation 
     
No Yes No Yes STATE*TIME 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. STATE, TIME and KIDAGE indicators are included in all 
specifications. ***, **, * indicates significant at the 99 percent, 95 percent and 90 percent level.  
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TABLE 22. REGRESSION RESULTS OF PROBABILITY OF WORKING AND 
HOURS OF WORK (DIVORCED SINGLE MOTHERS) 
 
Probit model Regression 
Coefficients Heckman two-step procedure(Dependent Variable: (Dependent Variable:  Working Hours) Labor force Participation)  
     
-0.0006 -0.0011 0.8958*** 0.9202*** GAIN Variable 
(0..0005) (0.0005) (0.2420) (0.2703)  
     
Estimated change from the 
SCHP expansion in 1999 
through 2005 
N/A N/A 0.0413 0.0420 
     
Simulated change from the 
SCHIP expansion by increasing 
20 percent GAIN variable 
above its current level 
N/A N/A 0.0500 0.0504 
     
0.0276 0.0263 47.4490*** 47.7599*** Mother's age 
(0.0161) (0.1633) (7.7632) (7.9723)  
-0.0439*** -0.0425* -49.1539*** -49.1159***Mother's age²/100 
(0.0206) (0.0208) (10.0988) (10.3498)  
-0.2273** -0.2480*** -32.3678 -19.3655 Number of own child < age 6 
(0.0286) (0.0292) (24.1201) (24.2547)  
-0.0406*** -0.0400** -14.1157** -14.2396** Number of person in family 
(0.0130) (0.0132) (6.9419) (7.0673)  
0.7398** 0.7524 61.8934 23.6250 Education 
(0.0362) (0.0366) (76.6068) (75.6418)  
-0.1137** -0.1064 9.6649 13.3789 Central City 
(0.0326) (0.0330) (17.4370) (17.7379)  
0.1854 0.1763* 63.7017** 56.7972* White 
(0.0604) (0.0609) (32.2392) (32.7892)  
0.0267 0.1268 -61.4083 45.4702 Northeast 
(0.1495) (0.1942) (62.1017) (184.3392)  
0.5184 0.5647 847.2137*** 859.2063***Constant 
(0.3337) (0.3573) (199.6288) (222.1446)  
     
     
16,928 16,766 16,929 16,929 Number of Observation 
     
No Yes No Yes STATE*TIME 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. STATE, TIME and KIDAGE indicators are included in all 
specifications. ***, **, * indicates significant at the 99 percent, 95 percent and 90 percent level.  
 
 
  
 
Chapter V  
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This research analyzes the impacts of expanding eligibility for the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program.  We first examine the magnitude of the crowd-out 
effect on private insurance, using longitudinal data from the SIPP data base.  We then 
examine whether expanding eligibility for SCHIP has had an impact on the mothers’ 
labor supply.   The labor supply estimates are based on data from the Current Population 
Survey from 1999 to 2005.  Although the primary contributions of this work are the 
empirical estimates, a basic theoretical structure is provided. 
There has been much concern among policy makers and state governments 
regarding the potential for crowd-out resulting from the SCHIP expansions for children. 
Our empirical results on this issue are obtained using longitudinal data from the 2001 
panel of the SIPP. We find that the nearly 26 percent of transitions from private coverage 
into SCHIP coverage were made by children who would have had private coverage in the 
absence of the expansions For the overall crowd-out of private coverage, we find that 
52.9 percent of the eligible children who moved to SCHIP from either private coverage 
or uninsured status would have had private coverage in the absence of the expansions. 
We find no evidence that those who were initially uninsured, but gained eligibility for 
SCHIP transitioned to private coverage in greater proportions than children in the control 
group. 
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The use of the longitudinal dataset to examine the crowd-out effect of the SCHIP 
allows us to address questions that could not be answered in previous studies that were 
based on cross-sectional datasets such as CPS and the early SCHIP dataset. Despite the 
relatively small sample size of the SIPP, we obtained statistically significant results in our 
models. The results from this study strongly suggest that the increased public coverage in 
low-income children after SCHIP implemented did not result from a substantive decrease 
in the uninsurance rate, but in fact resulted from decreases in private insurance coverage. 
About 53 percent of the movement from private coverage or uninsured status into the 
SCHIP program was attributable to displacement.   
Our result of an overall crowd-out effect of SCHIP of 53 percent and substitution 
effect of 26 percent in moving from private coverage to SCHIP is somewhat higher than 
most of the previous studies that examined the crowd-out effect of Medicaid expansions 
in 1980s and  early1990s. These results are not unexpected considering that the target 
group for the SCHIP expansion has higher-incomes and thus higher rates of private 
insurance coverage than the earlier Medicaid expansion target groups. Because the higher 
income group is likely to have a higher substitution effect than the lower income group, 
analysts predicted that it would lead to individuals dropping out of private insurance, 
when the SCHIP program was first signed into law in 1997. The higher the income 
eligibility for SCHIP and the greater the possibility of interaction between public and 
private insurance markets, the greater potential for crowd-out is. Another explanation of 
our results is that SCHIP programs offer generous benefits at substantially lower cost 
than most private insurance program.  
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The second research question concerns the impact of the SCHIP expansions on 
mothers’ labor supply. Using data from the Current Population Survey from 1999 to 2005, 
we estimated the effects of SCHIP income eligibility expansions on both single mothers’ 
decision to work and their working hours. The major findings of this paper are: first, 
SCHIP expansions have a significant positive impact on the hours-worked decision. 
Second, whereas most models yielded results indicating that SCHIP expansions have a 
generally insignificant impact on the decision to work, when the data are stratified into 
sub-samples based on marital status (never married, separated and divorced), the SCHIP 
expansions had a stronger impact on both never married single mother’s work decision 
and hours-worked decision, but insignificant impacts on previously married mother’s 
labor supply. 
Although the impact of the SCHIP expansion on the decision to work is 
statistically significant, the effect is small. The 20 percent increase over current SCHIP 
income level is expected to increase a never married single mother’s probability of being 
employed by 2.0 to 2.1 percentage points. Generally, the impact of the SCHIP expansion 
increasing our measure of eligibility 20 percent above its current level is estimated to 
increase an average single mother’s working hours by 3.2 percent (for the full sample in 
some specifications) to 6.2 percent points (specifications for never married women). 
 In conclusion, the results of this paper would tend to reduce the fears of 
economists, policy makers, and the public that income eligibility expansion for the public 
health insurance reduces work incentives. Expanding eligibility for public health 
insurance could result in reduced expenditures for  recipients by encouraging them to 
participate in labor force and  results in some growth in the taxable base due to increased 
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hours of work. However, several cautions must be applied in interpreting these findings. 
First, because the SCHIP expansions’ impact on single mother’s labor force participation 
is not necessarily representative, generalizing our results might be not appropriate for 
other demographic groups. Second, expanding public health insurance coverage might 
have had an effect on the demand for private coverage. The distortion of consumer’s 
decision on health insurance could increase the government expenditures for health care 
of newly eligible children, as our chapter III results on crowd out would indicate.  
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